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Creativity has been garnering increased attention in educational research and practice, so it is important to 
understand if there exist inequalities in student creativity as there are for other important educational 
outcomes.  In order to investigate this in a tractable, non-deficit way, we argue that our analyses of 
socioeconomic status (SES) and creativity would be best conducted through an educational 
neurocognitive learner profile lens, seeking ways that students from different socioeconomic backgrounds 
might have relative strengths and similarities in cognitive abilities underlying creative behaviors.  We 
analyzed student performance on a battery of cognitive measures assessing executive skills (working 
memory, inhibitory control, and shifting) and creative cognitive abilities (divergent thinking, insight, and 
associative processing) completed by 108 primary-aged students identified for their talent development 
potential.  A series of stepwise regression models were estimated in order to examine relationships 
between these cognitive skills and guardian SES.  Our results demonstrate the value of a learner profile 
framework:  whereas higher SES students demonstrated relative advantages on measures of working 
memory, insight, and associative processing, student across the SES spectrum performed similarly on 
tasks assessing divergent thinking, shifting, and inhibitory control.  We conclude by discussing 
implications of these findings for educational practice regarding talent development and research 
concerning both executive functioning and creativity. 
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Creativity has garnered increasing amounts of attention in educational research, policy and 
practice, as well as in other realms, such as business and economics.  Though the roots of creativity 
research are generally traced back to the middle of the twentieth century, some have noted the more 
recent exponential growth of published research – particularly psychometric approaches to examining 
creativity (Plucker & Makel, 2010).  Educational initiatives with broad support, such as the Partnerships 
for 21st Century Learning (www.p21.org), have highlighted creativity as an important skill to develop in 
students.  Creativity has not historically been viewed as crucial in the K-12 mainstream American 
curriculum, but there are signs around the world that an emphasis on nurturing creative potential in 
students is growing (Beghetto, 2010; Makel, 2009; Smith & Smith, 2010).  Simultaneously, there is a 
growing research interest in how best to develop and analyze creativity in classrooms (Beghetto, 2010; 
Delis et al., 2007; Freund & Holling, 2008; Gregory, Hardiman, Yarmolinskaya, Rinne, & Limb, 2013; 
Makel, 2009; Smith & Smith, 2010).   
As creativity is increasingly recognized as an important capacity for human life in the twenty-first 
century, one that schools will undoubtedly be charged with developing in students, it is important to 
understand to what extent there might exist inequalities.  As a society, we tend to accept individual 
differences in skills and abilities, but systematic, structural group differences or inequalities tend to be 
viewed less favorably.  One specific dimension of inequality that has long been of concern to those in 
education and sociology concerns socioeconomic status (SES), because it predicts – time and again – 
numerous important life outcomes, such as physical health, access to educational opportunities, and career 
prospects (Bradley & Corwyn, 2002).   
In education, differences among students according to their SES are of particular concern for at 
least two reasons.  First, though there are numerous stated purposes for education, it is uncontroversial to 
suggest that education is perceived by many as a means for developing citizens for a well-functioning 
democracy, for economic well-being, and for a good quality of life.  If certain groups are systematically 
disadvantaged in these respects, that should be concerning in and of itself.  Second, such student SES 
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differences are worrisome because these differences are thought to be – in large part – due to 
environmental disparities (Hackman, Farah, & Meaney, 2010).  As opposed to heritable differences, the 
environmental inequalities associated with SES are more amenable to intervention.  Indeed, one could 
argue for a moral, social justice imperative to intervene in order to ensure an equitable education system 
and society.  Therefore, particularly in education, it is important to uncover inequalities amongst students 
based upon their SES and then intervene where possible. 
Due to the abovementioned trends regarding creativity and education, it is important for 
education researchers to assess the degree to which this important twenty-first century skill is related to 
SES.  If there is indeed an imperative to remedy educational inequalities, their existence must first be 
demonstrated.  An obvious extension to the decades of SES-educational inequality research might begin 
with the question:  Is there a relationship between student SES and creativity? 
However, as will be subsequently demonstrated, even a quick glance at the creativity research 
shows this way of asking the question to be overly simplistic.  In terms of educational outcomes, 
creativity is a particularly complex construct; it can be analyzed at different levels of analysis, each often 
consisting of many components.  Examining some sort of overarching creativity variable and its 
association with SES is thus not likely to yield meaningful, actionable findings.  For this research task to 
become tractable, it seems that creativity needs to be analyzed at a more granular level.  As is explored in 
more detail in the following chapter, an educational cognitive neuroscience framework provides exactly 
the sort of precision and granularity necessary for this task by providing a way to analyze SES and 
cognition in more specific ways.     
As shown below, when we look at SES and creativity through this type of framework, we see the 
suggestion of certain cognitive and neural links between SES and creativity.  In particular, we will 
explore one promising cognitive link between SES and creative cognition: executive functioning.  Like 
the construct of creativity, however, executive functioning is also complex and any analysis thereof can 
benefit from a similar view towards component parts.  Thus, the task for the researcher is getting more 
complex: the examination of SES, combined with components of creativity and components of executive 
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functioning.  The explorable interactions are many, so, we will argue that these three constructs be 
analyzed together as a learner profile of specific cognitive skills across levels of SES.  This proves to be a 
more fruitful approach than looking for broad SES differences, of equal magnitude and direction, across 
all executive and creative cognitive skills, allowing instead for a potential diversity of relationships. 
To revise the previous research question, the present work aims to answer a more precise inquiry:  
Do students from different SES backgrounds have different profiles of creative cognitive skills and 
underlying executive skills?  As our review will show, there has been little work thus far explicitly or 
conclusively examining this from a neurocognitive perspective.  The work that has been conducted has 
some theoretical and methodological limitations which constrain the ability to arrive at a direct answer.  
However, finding answers may have important implications for education, specifically regarding attaining 
creative equity and creative talent development. 
This research seeks to contribute to this gap in our understanding.  Situated in an educational 
cognitive neuroscience framework, we investigated a particular piece of a much broader research agenda 
ultimately aiming to understand the complex interactions between SES and creativity in schools: the 
relationship between student SES and particular cognitive skills thought to underlie the creative cognitive 
process.    
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Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
In order to piece together the educational cognitive neuroscience framework that supported this 
research, I will review a few different strands of research, weaving them together to argue that 
socioeconomic status (SES), executive functioning, and creative cognition can be fruitfully examined 
simultaneously.  First, I will briefly review research related to the construct, measurement, and historical 
educational findings of SES.  Second, I will review the social cognitive neuroscience literature, in which 
neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists have included the sociological construct of SES as a variable 
by which to parse specific neurocognitive outcomes.  As one of the foci of this field, executive and 
prefrontal functions will be highlighted.  Third, I will then introduce the nascent findings regarding the 
cognitive and neural underpinnings of creativity.  Like the social cognitive neuroscience research, 
executive and prefrontal functions play an important role, particularly in three creative cognitive skills: 
divergent thinking (DT), insight, and associative processing.  Finally, because these bodies of research, 
considered altogether, suggest possible connections between SES, executive skills, and creative cognitive 
skills, I will explore the limited work that has directly addressed SES and creativity.  These studies will 
be critically evaluated in order to demonstrate why more research needs to be conducted on this topic.  
Research questions and hypotheses conclude this chapter. 
Before starting the review, it is worth reiterating that our investigation of relationships between 
SES and creative cognition was not about seeking the presence of any gaps or deficits, particularly for 
lower SES students.  Instead, the entirety of this research effort was viewed through and motivated by a 
cognitive profile perspective.  Such a perspective provides for the possibility that both lower and higher 
SES students might have their own sets, or profiles, of cognitive strengths.  This non-deficit (Ladson-
Billings, 2007; Persell, 1981; Valencia, 1997; Valencia, 2010) way of considering students’ diverse 
cognitive profiles is arguably a more helpful perspective for an educator who must ultimately differentiate 
instruction, by capitalizing on diverse strengths, in order to meet students’ various needs – without 
viewing students as inherently deficient.  As will be justified further below, viewing student differences 
by socioeconomic environments as adaptive – rather than deficient – allows for a different kind of 
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educational philosophy; from such an adaptive, neurobiological perspective (e.g., Ellis & Del Giudice, 
2014), students are seen not as deficient relative to some norm, but rather a product of their particular 
environments.  A student produced from a particular environment will therefore have a particular 
neurocognitive profile of strengths and weaknesses in various environments, such as home, school, or 
workplace.  Put another way, this study is about an examination of the potentially different environmental 
and cognitive paths to positive creative cognitive outcomes. 
Socioeconomic Status: Construct and Measurement 
Broadly, SES entails levels of access to capital of various kinds, such as social, financial, and 
cultural, to name a few (Bradley & Corwyn, 2002; Coleman, 1988).  It encompasses these resources 
available to people and is typically measured in childhood, from a sociological perspective, by some 
combination of household financial resources, guardian educational attainment, and guardian occupation 
(Cowan et al., 2012; Entwisle & Astone, 1994; Hauser, 1994).     
To help guide the subsequent review of SES research, it may be helpful to categorize the many 
permutations of childhood SES measures into a few buckets for ease of classification.  First, SES is often 
analyzed in terms of groups of individuals or individually.  In the first instance, there might, for example, 
be a comparison between a high SES group of students and a lower SES group of students.  When 
analyzed individually, SES is usually treated as a continuous variable, with each student analyzed 
according to their own observed SES.   
Second, SES might be analyzed using a single indicator, multiple indicators, or a composite 
comprised of multiple indicators.  The three most common indicators are guardian finances, education, 
and occupation.  In education research, a participant’s eligibility for the National School Lunch Program 
(NSLP) is often used as a proxy for SES, or at least for the financial component.  However, there is 
reason to believe that NSLP participation does not adequately reflect socioeconomic status (Harwell & 
LeBeau, 2010; Hauser, 1994).  The financial aspect is also often captured by a measure of income (e.g., 
highest guardian income or total household income), but is also less frequently assessed by measures of 
wealth or similar tools that look beyond only the income-related financial resources.  Guardian education 
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typically refers to years of education or specific degrees attained.  Finally, guardian occupation is 
typically coded or transformed to reflect some sort of rating of its cultural standing (e.g., prestige).  A 
common example of a tool used to provide a numerical ranking for a guardian’s occupation is the 
Hollingshead Index (Hollingshead, 1975).   
Socioeconomic Status and Education 
The relationships between SES and education outcomes have been explored for decades in 
sociology (e.g., see Parsons, 1959; Sewell, Haller, & Portes, 1969), and have been explored since across a 
variety of disciplines.  These educational outcomes – including, for example, standardized test 
achievement, dropout rates, and educational attainment – are key indicators of inequalities that can be 
addressed.  For example, Berliner (2009), reviewed a wide array of evidence about the environmental 
conditions of poverty and low SES outside of schools which ultimately predict disparate achievement 
outcomes within schools.  Bradley and Corwyn (2002), reviewed a wealth of developmental psychology 
findings regarding SES, including empirical evidence connecting SES to health, cognitive outcomes, 
academic achievement, academic attainment, social and emotional growth, as well as the various 
proposed moderators and mediators of these inequalities.  An important point to take away from findings 
like these is that students from lower SES households typically face a plurality of risks that are 
cumulative in their impact (Evans & Kim, 2010). 
Notwithstanding this lengthy discussion in education and sociological research about various 
inequalities, very real differences as a function of SES still exist.  According to the 2013 National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP; http://www.nationsreportcard.gov/), of those eligible for 
free lunch (an admittedly rough proxy for SES, as was noted above; Cowan et al., 2003; Harwell & 
LeBeau, 2010) in fourth grade mathematics through the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), 28% 
scored below basic, 47% basic, 22% proficient, and 2% advanced.  Contrast these scores with those not 
eligible: 7% below basic, 34% basic, 46% proficient, and 13% advanced.  There are similar trends in 
fourth grade reading, as well as both subjects at grade eight, suggesting a relationship between 
socioeconomic standing (at least the financial component) and educational achievement nationwide.  
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These numbers also suggest the existence of excellence gaps in America: discrepancies between the 
percentages of students eligible and ineligible for the NSLP scoring at an advanced level (Plucker, 
Burroughs, & Song, 2010).   
Specific Neurocognitive Associations with Socioeconomic Status 
Contrasted with the analyses of relatively broad outcomes (e.g., math achievement) in the 
educational research base, there are some neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists over the past two 
decades who have explored SES inequalities at a more specific neurocognitive level.  Indeed, a social 
cognitive neuroscience perspective has emerged in order to consider how important sociological 
constructs like SES (i.e., the social context) might be related to particular neurocognitive functions.  For 
example, there is a group of researchers who have examined how SES and childhood poverty relate to a 
battery of specific neurocognitive functions (Farah et al., 2008; Farah et al. 2006; Fernald, Weber, 
Galasso, & Ratsifandrihamanana, 2011; Hackman & Farah, 2009; Hackman, Farah, & Meaney, 2010; 
Lipina & Posner, 2012; Noble, McCandliss, & Farah, 2007; Noble, Norman, & Farah, 2005; Noble, 
Tottenham, & Casey, 2005; Waber, Forbes, Almli, Blood, & The Brain Development Cooperative Group, 
2012).  Many of these researchers voice the promise of uncovering more specific associations between 
socioeconomic standing and neurocognitive functioning than have been found in past research, ultimately 
leading to better targeted interventions of the skills underlying broad educational outcomes.   
Founded in the non-human animal literature and extending into human studies, these researchers 
have sought to examine which effects of various constitutive elements of SES and poverty (e.g., stress, 
environmental enrichment, etc.) generalize to humans.  The main finding is that specific environmental 
conditions that vary with SES are each differentially associated with specific neurocognitive functions.  
More simply, SES does not affect all parts of the brain and mind equally, nor can all of the affected parts 
trace their causes back to one set of constitutive SES elements.  Relatively large disparities – favoring 
higher SES students – in language functioning are found in nearly all studies that examine it (e.g., Noble, 
Wolmetz, Ochs, Farah, & McCandlinss, 2006); though, moderate to small differences have also been 
found in executive and prefrontal functioning (Blair et al., 2011; D’Angiulli, Herdman, Stapells, & 
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Hertzman, 2008; Hughes & Ensor, 2005; Kishiyama, Boyce, Jimenez, Perry, & Knight, 2009; Lipina et 
al, 2013; Mezzacappa, 2004; Raver, Blair, Willoughby, & The Family Life Project Key Investigators, 
2013; Stevens, Lauinger, & Neville, 2009), as well as memory, mathematical cognition (Pappas, 
Ginsburg, & Jiang, 2003), amygdala and emotional functioning (Gianaros et al., 2008), and visual and 
spatial skills (e.g., Levine, Vasilyeva, Lourenco, Newcombe, & Huttenlocher, 2005).  For other cognitive 
skills, no associations with SES were found:  for example, visuospatial and memory skills (Noble, 
Norman, & Farah, 2005) or reward processing (Noble, McCandliss, & Farah, 2007). 
Many mechanisms – which are themselves directly related to the various forms of capital 
mentioned in the review of SES above – are proposed in order to link child SES to specific 
neurocognitive outcomes, such as chronic stress, environmental enrichment or stimulation, and parental 
nurturance (e.g., Hackman, Farah, & Meaney, 2010).  Differential exposure to such environmental 
conditions results in differential developmental outcomes on some – but not all – neurocognitive 
functions.  For example, there is a great deal of evidence suggesting that the experience of chronic stress 
may be one of the more substantial ways by which lower SES influences executive and prefrontal 
functioning, memory, and learning (Blair, 2010; Carrion & Wong 2012; Evans, 2003; Evans, Kim, Ting, 
Tesher, & Shannis, 2007; Evans, Schamberg, & McEwen, 2009; Joels, Pu, Wiegert, Oitzl, & Krugers, 
2006; Juster, McEwen, & Lupien, 2010; Kim & Yoon, 1998; Lupien, Maheu, Tu, Fiocco, & Schramek, 
2007; McEwen, 2013; Packard, 2009). 
Executive Functioning Concepts 
Before the subsequent discussion focusing on executive functioning and its role in this social 
cognitive neuroscience literature, it is useful to briefly define how a few terms are being used here.  By 
executive functioning, we are referring to a collection of cognitive skills thought to depend, in large part, 
on the prefrontal cortex, which help to plan and control goal-oriented behaviors.  Three of these cognitive 
skills which are central to this research are working memory, inhibitory control, and shifting.  Working 
memory refers to the capacity a person has to simultaneously hold and manipulate information in 
consciousness.  Inhibitory control concerns the ability to willfully exert influence to inhibit a prepotent 
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response.  Finally, shifting refers to an ability to flexibly change focus between multiple, often competing, 
demands.   
Socioeconomic Status and Executive Functioning 
Of the skills and functions explored by the social cognitive neuroscientists, executive and 
prefrontal functioning is particularly interesting.  First, as will be demonstrated in this section, it is 
reliably predicted by child SES; in general, higher SES is related to better executive skills.  Second, it is 
also – though, to a lesser degree – cited as an important area of cognition underlying creative cognitive 
skills, a topic explored in the next section.  So, executive and prefrontal functioning may be a 
neurocognitive bridge between these two research bases. 
Third, and perhaps more importantly, executive functioning consists of several skills that have 
been linked with so-called “higher-order thinking” and academic success.  For example, Raver and Blair 
(2016) reviewed three of the most common executive functioning skills – flexible attentional control, 
working memory, and inhibition – and their links to student success in the classroom.  Importantly, they 
also shared evidence about the malleability of these skills through educational interventions.  Little (2017) 
presented findings based on a nationally-representative sample of early-primary-aged students suggesting 
differences in both working memory and executive flexibility by SES (he notes the importance of 
inhibition as well to studying executive functioning, but it was not available in the dataset to be analyzed).  
Lechuga, Pelegrina, Pelaez, Martin-Puga, and Justicia (2016) also provided evidence that working 
memory is important to verbal, quantitative, and classroom achievement with a sample of fourth-graders, 
and Lawson and Farah (2017) found that a statistically significant relationship between child SES and 
math achievement was partially mediated by executive functioning measures of memory span, working 
memory, and shifting.  In sum, not only is there evidence that shifting, working memory, and inhibition 
are important for academic success, there is also evidence that these skills are distributed inequitably 
across SES, a point now elaborated upon. 
Executive and prefrontal advantages for higher SES children.  Farah and colleagues (2006) 
examined neurocognitive functioning in relation to SES with a broad battery of measures, given to a 
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sample of 60 children, ranging in age from 10 to 13.  They analyzed SES by low and middle groups, 
distinguished by receipt of welfare assistance, Hollingshead occupational ratings, and postsecondary 
educational attainment.  The executive measures captured three cognitive functions: working memory, 
cognitive control, and reward processing.  They found significant SES differences in working memory 
and cognitive control favoring the middle SES children, but no differences in reward processing. 
Noble, McCandliss, and Farah (2007) similarly employed a wide battery of neurocognitive 
measures, but their study differed in its continuous operationalization of SES, indicated by education, 
income, and occupation.  The sample was comprised of 150 first-graders.  Similar to Farah et al. (2006), 
they measured working memory, cognitive control, and reward processing, finding again that SES 
significantly predicted differences in working memory and cognitive control, but not reward processing. 
Noble, Norman, and Farah (2005) followed a similar protocol of employing a wide battery of 
tasks, but with 60 kindergarten students.  They measured SES similar to Farah and colleagues (2006), 
using a group-based analysis distinguished by education, Hollingshead rating, and an income-to-needs 
ratio.  Their results showed that SES was positively predictive of executive skills overall (as a composite), 
but only predictive of inhibitory control – and not the spatial working memory – when analyzed 
separately.   
Hughes and Ensor (2005) investigated executive functioning and theory of mind in early 
childhood (n = 140 two-year-old children).  To recruit children from low SES family backgrounds, they 
focused on households that met multiple indicators of educational, occupational, and income 
disadvantage.  Five different tasks were used to assess executive functioning, which variously captured 
skills like working memory, cognitive control, and flexible rule-following.  Among other results, they 
found that social disadvantage was predictive of executive functioning. 
Lipina and colleagues (2013) researched executive functioning and fluid intelligence, the latter of 
which may be associated with executive and prefrontal functioning (Blair, 2006).  This research was 
conducted in Argentina with a sample of 250 students with a mean age of 4.87 (SD = 0.59).  Their SES 
measure was designed to indicate unsatisfied basic needs and other experiences of disadvantage in 
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childhood related to the common indicators of education, occupation, and income, and their cognitive 
battery was meant to assess non-verbal executive control.  They found that the children classified as 
having unsatisfied basic needs performed significantly lower on most – though not all – of the tasks, 
including those assessing cognitive control, working memory, different attention networks, and fluid 
intelligence.  As an example of similar performance across groups, children with both satisfied and 
unsatisfied basic needs performed similarly in reaction time on the different subtasks of the Attentional 
Networks Test. 
Mezzacappa (2004) examined the relationship between a continuous composite measure of SES 
and a battery of attentional processes measures (i.e., the Attention Network Test) connected with 
executive and prefrontal functioning.  In this sample of children (n = 249) ranging in age from about four 
to seven, Mezzacappa found that alerting, orienting, and executive attention processes were quicker and 
more accurate in higher SES children; the higher SES children responded more proficiently to the alerting 
attention cues and interference demands of the executive attention cues. 
Fernald, Weber, Galasso, and Ratsifandrihamanana (2011) investigated working memory, fluid 
reasoning, sustained attention, and inhibitory control – among a broader battery of neurocognitive 
measures – in relation to SES, measured by indicators of education and finances.  Their nationally 
representative sample of children ranging in age from 3 to 6 years in Madagascar was somewhat unique 
compared to the above samples due to relatively greater overall levels of depravation and poverty.  
However, even among this particularly disadvantaged sample, SES had a positive relationship with 
cognitive outcomes, including memory, working memory, sustained attention, visual-spatial processing, 
and fluid reasoning.  Overall, they found that these cognitive differences by SES were nearly double at 
age six compared to what they were at age three. 
In addition to the above cognitive findings on measures thought to be largely localized in the 
prefrontal cortex, some researchers present direct evidence relating SES to electrical recordings of 
prefrontal neural activity.  For example, one group analyzed event-related potential (ERP) measures of 
prefrontal electrophysiological activity, in addition to cognitive measures, in a sample of 28 children 
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ranging in age from 7 to 12 (Kishiyama, Boyce, Jimenez, Perry, & Knight, 2009).  They used three 
indicators of SES – education, income, and an income-to-needs ratio – to distinguish higher and lower 
SES groups.  The cognitive assessments of executive functioning included measures of working memory, 
visuomotor attention, cognitive flexibility, inhibitory control, and semantic fluency.  ERP results were 
recorded during an attention task with standard, target, and novel stimuli.  For the cognitive tasks, the 
results showed an advantage for higher SES children with working memory, cognitive flexibility, and 
semantic fluency, but not visuomotor attention or inhibitory control.  Shifting to the ERP results, they 
found significant differences between the groups in the prefrontal cortex components related to visual 
attention and attention to novel stimuli. 
Two groups of researchers have examined ERP measures of selective auditory attention, a 
component of executive and prefrontal functioning (D’Angiulli, Herdman, Stapells, & Hertzman, 2008; 
Stevens, Lauinger, & Neville, 2009).  D’Angiulli, Herdman, Stapells, and Hertzman (2008) created a 
composite measure of SES based on education and occupation, as well as neighborhood quality and single 
parenthood status.  Twenty-eight students – recruited from middle-school grades, with an approximate 
mean age of 13 – engaged in a task in which they were asked to pay attention to two pure auditory tones 
while ignoring two others, indicating their attention to tones of a particular frequency and duration by 
pressing a button.  They found that, though the students from both SES groups performed similarly 
behaviorally, the students from the low SES group displayed ERP results suggesting that they pay similar 
attention to relevant and irrelevant auditory stimuli, whereas such brain activity for irrelevant stimuli was 
diminished in the higher SES group.  Stevens, Lauinger, and Neville (2009) recruited a sample (n = 32) 
that was younger than that of D’Angiulli and colleagues (M = 6.1, [3-8]).  Instead of auditory tones as the 
stimuli, Stevens and colleagues used narrative recordings, one being a distractor and one being that to 
which children were instructed to attend.  Again, they found evidence of reduced selective attention in the 
lower SES group (distinguished by indicators of education and occupation), with this group being less 
able to filter out the distracting, irrelevant stimuli. 
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Executive skills with no socioeconomic differences or with possible advantages for children 
of lower SES.  Importantly, however, not all SES-executive and prefrontal functioning findings reveal 
lower performance amongst lower SES children.  On some functions no differences are found.  On others 
lower SES participants demonstrated higher performance than their more affluent peers.  For example, 
Farah and colleagues (2006) found that children were statistically similar on reward processing, and 
Noble, McCandliss, and Farah (2007) found no SES differences in reward processing, nor on specific 
working memory and cognitive control tasks. 
Perhaps even more interesting, some scholars – particularly those who have adopted an 
evolutionary life history approach (e.g., Ellis & Del Giudice, 2014) – have uncovered cognitive functions 
on which lower SES participants demonstrated an advantage relative to their higher SES peers.  In one 
recent example, Mittal, Griskevicius, Simpson, Sung, and Young (2015) put forth the concept of early life 
conditions resulting in adaptive – as opposed to deficient – behaviors.  Within this framework, they 
proposed that children with different early environments (measured by a retrospective participant 
assessment of unpredictability in early childhood and a measure of childhood SES) might have 
differentially adapted cognitive functions such that adults from both low and high SES backgrounds 
might each have relative, but different, cognitive strengths.  Specifically, they looked at two measures of 
executive functioning: inhibition and shifting.  They found that adults who had grown up in unpredictable 
environments performed better than those who did not on the shifting task, but not on the inhibition task 
when the context of the executive functioning assessments was experimentally manipulated to be 
uncertain.  Furthermore, they only observed this finding with their measures of childhood uncertainty, not 
SES.  However, the experience of uncertainty is a common feature of a lower SES environment (Bradley 
& Corwyn, 2002), and even the prospect of observing such a cognitive relationship with childhood SES 
deserves more attention, particularly during childhood, as opposed to retrospectively. 
With these executive and prefrontal findings from the social cognitive neuroscience literature as a 
foundation, it is worth pursuing how the specific neurocognitive skills implicated (i.e., working memory, 
inhibitory control, and shifting) might underly a higher-order skill like creativity.  Waber, Forbes, Almli, 
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Blood, and The Brain Development Cooperative Group (2012) made the argument that SES effects tend 
to be greater when looking at integrative cognitive functions (i.e., higher-order functions, recruiting 
multiple neurocognitive systems) versus lower-level functions (e.g., a specific sub-function, such as 
working memory, within a neurocognitive system, such as executive functioning).  As shown next, there 
is some evidence that executive and prefrontal functioning may contribute to creative behavior, and since 
relationships have been found between SES and executive skills, the above line of reasoning from Waber 
and colleagues suggests that SES might be even more predictive of creativity – particularly insofar as it is 
an executive-based skill.   
The Executive and Prefrontal Underpinnings of Creative Cognition 
Modern creativity research began in earnest around the middle of the twentieth century (Runco & 
Albert, 2010).  Since then, there has been a proliferation of theories, paradigms, and perspectives 
regarding how best to empirically examine the construct of creativity (Kozbelt, Beghetto, & Runco, 
2010).  Arguably, all of these theories in some way address portions of a common definition of creativity 
offered by Plucker, Beghetto, and Dow (2004): “Creativity is the interaction among aptitude, process, and 
environment by which an individual or group produces a perceptible product that is both novel and useful 
as defined within a social context” (p. 90).  A definition like this demonstrates why proposing any simple 
measure of a broad, complex behavior like being creative is likely an impossible – or meaningless – task.  
Among the various frameworks for examining different aspects of this definition of creativity are those 
that view creativity through cognitive or neuroscientific lenses (e.g., Dietrich, 2004; Finke, Ward, & 
Smith, 1992).  These neurocognitive frameworks focus primarily on the aptitude, process, individual, 
novelty, and usefulness aspects of the definition.   
One of the early and oft-cited examples of what might be loosely termed a cognitive description 
of the creative process is given by Wallas (1926).  In The Art of Thought, Wallas explores many perennial 
issues in psychological and brain sciences, though, by far the most frequently cited contribution in 
modern creativity literature is his passage describing the stages of creative thinking: preparation, 
incubation, illumination, and verification (p. 38).  As he conceives them, preparation is the stage at which 
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we initially approach a problem; incubation is a largely unconscious, or implicit, process during which 
associations are made in memory; illumination might be thought of simply as the moment of insight, 
when a creative solution enters consciousness; and, verification is the stage when that solution is 
consciously, systematically, and rationally evaluated. 
There are, of course, much more modern accounts of creativity inspired by cognitive psychology 
and neuroscience (e.g., Kaufman, Kornilov, Bristol, Tan, & Grigorenko, 2010).  The foci of these 
accounts are on specific cognitive capacities and neural circuits thought to contribute to creative behavior.  
Perhaps the most prominent voices regarding the cognitive underpinnings of creativity belong to Thomas 
Ward and his colleagues (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1995; Ward & Kolomyts, 
2010).  They introduced the creative cognition approach as one of the foundational viewpoints for 
viewing creativity through a cognitive lens.  Like the other cognitive and neuroscientific accounts of 
creativity proposed below, the essence of the creative cognitive approach consists of a combination of 
knowledge and the ways in which that knowledge is manipulated (e.g., accessed, combined, evaluated for 
novelty, etc.).  The basic theory behind this approach is known as the Geneplore Model, which seeks to 
explain the association and manipulation of ideas by several cognitive processes that may or may not 
produce a creative idea (Ward & Kolomyts, 2010).  At its core, this approach is about getting to as 
granular and specific a level as possible in describing the cognitive processes that ultimately combine to 
produce creative output.  To Ward and colleagues, such processes include – but are not limited to – 
retrieving memories, combining ideas, analogizing, and various stages of problem discovery and solving. 
An even more recent neurocognitive account of creativity is offered by Dietrich (2004), based 
upon the idea that accounts of creativity must inevitably be grounded in neurocognitive findings.  He 
developed a heuristic of four different types of creativity, each of which is a cross between two 
dimensions: the type of processing and the type of information being processed.  The two types of 
processing that he distinguished are deliberate (i.e., analytical and attention-directed thinking, initiated by 
the prefrontal cortex) and spontaneous (i.e., unconscious thinking that eventually enters working memory 
in the prefrontal cortex, for example, in the form of an insight), whereas the two types of information are 
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cognitive and emotional.  These types of creativity might be usefully thought of as different profiles of 
creativity, which, when the state of the science progresses far enough, might provide pathways to 
individualize creativity in the classroom.  Dietrich’s emphasis is on functional neurological circuits to 
distinguish these four types of creativity, with the prefrontal cortex playing a key role.  He proposes that 
emotional information is largely contributed by the limbic system, whereas cognitive information – 
closely related with long-term memory – is related to the temporal, occipital, and parietal lobes.  Playing 
an integrative role, with its various executive functions, the prefrontal cortex is proposed to be the key 
area of the brain where novel ideas are brought into consciousness and evaluated for their creative 
contribution, thus implicating executive functions such as working memory (e.g., the ability to 
consciously process potentially creative associations), shifting, cognitive control, and the ability to 
evaluate novel ideas for their utility.  There is a distinction between knowledge on the one hand, 
conceptualized as providing the content and potential associations in creative processes, and creative 
thinking on the other, largely about the prefrontal cortex integrating and evaluating the knowledge in 
order to result in a novel and useful idea or expression.   
Dietrich (2004) grounds his theoretical framework in empirical findings regarding neurological 
processes that are part of ordinary mental processes; that is, he proposes that creative cognition is similar 
to other mental processes studied by cognitive neuroscientists in that they share many of the same neural 
circuits, albeit with different outcomes.  This view is similar to Ward and Kolomyts (2010), as well as to 
Kaufman, Kornilov, Bristol, Tan, and Grigorenko (2010), who also suggest that a cognitive phenomenon 
like creativity must have a neural basis that can, ideally, be discovered not unlike other common cognitive 
processes.  Dietrich also hypothesized that, because the prefrontal cortex is critical to creative cognition, 
and because this particular part of the brain has a protracted developmental trajectory, creativity might 
look different in children than it does in adults – a prediction that should be especially true for those types 
of creativity that are heavily dependent upon the prefrontal cortex (e.g., deliberate processing).  In order 
to begin to empirically examine this theoretical framework, he concluded his explication with an explicit 
17 
 
recommendation to incorporate cognitive measures for which the neurological underpinnings are well 
established and localized in new cognitive examinations of creativity. 
Following in a similar vein a few years later, Dietrich and Kanso (2010) reviewed 63 
neuroscientific studies that have explored creativity in terms of divergent thinking, artistic and musical 
talent, or insight.  Based upon many contradictory, varied, or null findings in this still nascent literature, 
they concluded – like Dietrich (2004) – that, from a neurocognitive standpoint, there must be multiple 
types of creativity and note that creativity, broadly, recruits numerous circuits and areas of the brain.  Put 
more concisely, from a neurocognitive standpoint, creativity is best conceived of as pluralistic; a broad 
notion of creativity is problematic.  However, they do emphasize that the prefrontal cortex is frequently 
implicated in these findings, particularly in divergent thinking and insight studies; though, there is no 
consistency regarding particular areas and functions within the prefrontal cortex, and there may be a 
distinction between different types of creativity depending upon whether or not areas of the prefrontal 
cortex are relatively activated or deactivated.  A similar point is made by Kleibeuker, De Dreu, and Crone 
(2016) when they described the developmental trajectories of creativity in adolescence and adulthood.  
They emphasize both the multiple, distinct cognitive skills underlying creative development and also the 
reliance on prefrontal and executive processes.   
Dietrich and Kanso (2010) draw specific attention to divergent thinking measures, concluding 
that they may not be the most promising method for exploring specific neural circuits contributing to 
creativity given the likely plurality of cognitive and neural functions recruited – an argument similarly 
applied in critique of Wallas’ (1926) stages of creative thought as rather coarse composites of many more 
granular neurocognitive processes.  Still, divergent thinking tasks are arguably very diverse in task 
demands and content (as, indeed, they recognized in their review of prior research), and perhaps a better 
understanding of the cognitive underpinnings of different types of divergent thinking tasks is needed 
before these can be usefully employed in neurological studies.  They suggest that future research needs to 
begin to consider different types of creativity and the many possible neurocognitive sub-processes that 
might differentially underpin them, an approach which they argue might begin to allow for inroads for 
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many of the larger theoretical controversies in the field (e.g., the degree to which creativity is domain-
specific or how creativity might manifest across different age ranges), a sentiment similarly echoed by 
Kaufman and colleagues (2010).  However, with the present state of neurocognitive knowledge of 
creativity, more empirical work on the foundations of creative cognition needs to be performed in order to 
arrive at a theoretical framework which might address such issues. 
Beyond Ward, Dietrich, and their colleagues, other creativity researchers have also implicated 
executive and prefrontal functioning.  In a review of the evolutionary biological research concerning 
human creativity, Gabora and Kaufman (2010) emphasized the importance of the development of the 
prefrontal cortex in the evolutionary history of human creativity:  as overall brain size enlarged, allowing 
for more encoding and possible associations in the brain, they hypothesize that higher order functions 
supported by the prefrontal cortex were important for adaptively utilizing these complex neural networks 
for creative ends.  They also pointed to the evolved ability to shift seamlessly between divergent and 
convergent thinking as crucial to the cognitive processes producing creative ideas and products.  Benedek 
and Neubauer (2013) made a similar argument in their empirical investigation of Mednick’s (1962) 
associative processing model of creative cognition.  Specifically, they found that it is not individual 
differences in the associative organization of memory which are primarily responsible for creativity, but 
rather what they hypothesize as being the differences in individual ability to adaptively utilize executive 
functions to process the contents of associative memory in service of creative output.  Finally, in their 
article aimed at connecting creativity research with the classroom, Gregory, Hardiman, Yarmolinskaya, 
Rinne, and Limb (2013) point to research emphasizing executive functioning as a crucial foundation for 
creative cognition.   
Several neurological studies converge on similar conclusions.  In a functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) study of the neural underpinning of creative jazz improvisation, Limb and Braun (2008) 
found that improvisation was associated with dissociated neural activity in the prefrontal cortex, with 
deactivation in some areas and increased activation in others; however (as was suggested by work cited 
above) they also found widespread activation in other areas of the brain, pointing to the complexity of 
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creative activity.  Jung and Ryman (2013) reviewed structural and functional brain imaging evidence 
regarding creativity through the lens of Wallas’ (1926) stages.  Like, Limb and Braun, they found 
evidence of dissociative activation in the prefrontal cortex; these dissociative findings in the prefrontal 
cortex may point to a common conceptual theme in the literature of the importance of both disinhibition 
and inhibition during the creative process, perhaps for different types of creativity (e.g., as per Dietrich, 
2004).  Rutter and colleagues (2012) examined what they termed conceptual expansion (a state of mind 
indicated by a person’s judgment that a stimulus is both novel and appropriate – both key criteria for 
creativity) using fMRI.  They found that when participants viewed novel and appropriate stimuli – as 
opposed to those that were only novel or only appropriate – a unique neural circuit throughout frontal and 
temporal areas of the brain was activated. 
In all of this neurocognitive work exploring the underpinnings of creativity, and particularly those 
articles addressing executive and prefrontal functioning, three creative cognitive skills are given the most 
attention: divergent thinking (DT), insight, and associative processing.  Below, each of these three skills 
are reviewed, in turn, regarding conceptual definitions, measurement, and connections with executive and 
prefrontal functioning.  Of note at this point, Fishkin and Johnson (1998) make the argument that 
measuring creativity in children can be quite different than measuring creativity in adults since it may not 
be as easy to recognize creative behaviors or potential for creative accomplishments.  Perhaps such 
cognitive constructs provide an ideal measurement strategy for examining the precursors of creative 
behaviors in children. 
Divergent thinking.  Whereas convergent thinking emphasizes arriving at a single, correct 
solution, DT involves generating many different ideas.  Runco (2010) suggests that measures of DT can 
offer relatively objective indicators of creative potential, creative problem solving, or the natural 
generation of ideas that occurs in everyday life.  However, DT is not synonymous with creativity and 
these measures are not simple measures of creativity.  Instead, such measures are better classified within a 
larger set of measures in the psychometric literature which get at ideation, or the generation of ideas 
(Runco, 2010).  Plucker and Makel (2010), as well as Runco (2010) trace the earliest empirical models of 
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creativity including DT to Guilford in the 1950s and then Torrance in the 1970s.  Indeed, the Torrance 
Tests of Creative Thinking are probably the most widely employed measures of DT thinking today.  
Many researchers have commented on the prominence of DT measurement in the field of creativity 
research (Fishkin & Johnson, 1998; Kaufman, Plucker, & Russell, 2012; Plucker & Makel, 2010; Runco, 
2010), suggesting simultaneously that these measures are often too heavily relied upon to indicate all of 
creativity, but also that they are indeed an important part of creative thought.   
Prior empirical work has also uncovered many important characteristics of DT and its measures.  
Kim (2008) found that DT tasks are generally more highly correlated with creative achievement than IQ 
scores.  While most studies seem to examine DT in later childhood and beyond, there is some evidence 
that this skill can be meaningfully measured as early as age two (Bijvoet-van den Berg & Hoicka, 2014).  
This ability to measure DT throughout most of the lifespan may be important based upon a review of 
evidence by Runco (2010) suggesting that DT can be intervened upon, developed, and improved.  
As Plucker and Makel (2010) review, measures of DT generally require a person to generate as 
many different ideas to a prompt as possible and come in either verbal or figural forms.  There are many 
variations on this basic idea of measuring divergent thinking: for example, whether or not the test is 
timed, measuring different types of divergent thinking, and so on.  The results of these assessments are 
commonly scored for fluency (i.e., the number of responses generated), originality, flexibility (i.e., the 
number of categories of ideas), and elaboration.  However, there are numerous viewpoints regarding how 
best to score divergent thinking results (e.g., Kaufman, Plucker, & Russell, 2012; Plucker, Qian, & Wang, 
2011; Silvia, 2011; Silvia, Martin, & Nusbaum, 2009). 
Of the three creative cognitive skills here examined, there is perhaps the most evidence thus far 
connecting this one to executive and prefrontal processes.  For example, Mayseless, Eran, and Shamay-
Tsoory (2015) examined the originality aspect of DT tasks using fMRI.  Based upon prior research 
suggesting the importance of generating associations and inhibiting immediate or obvious responses for 
original ideation, they hypothesized that prefrontal brain areas related to associative processing and 
cognitive control would be functionally important for generating original ideas.  Indeed, they found that 
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several areas of the brain were activated during original idea generation, including areas in the prefrontal 
cortex, and that greater originality was associated with higher levels of activation in some of these areas.  
They noted that these areas include some that are commonly associated with the ability to make flexible 
associations, as well as cognitive control.  Their conclusion was that DT necessitates neural systems 
responsible for generating and evaluating original ideas. 
Using multilevel modeling in an educational context, Kuhn and Holling (2009) explored 
relationships between DT and several other variables, including cognitive variables addressing processing 
capacity (which they roughly equate with fluid intelligence), processing speed, and memory.  In their 
sample of 1098 students, clustered within 55 different classrooms, they found that processing capacity 
and processing speed – but not memory – were significantly correlated with DT.  As noted elsewhere, 
some researchers have associated fluid intelligence with executive or prefrontal functioning (e.g., Blair, 
2006).  
Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, and Wynn (2007) conducted two experiments to better understand 
strategies used and the underlying executive functions involved in performance on alternative uses DT 
tasks.  In terms of strategy use, in the first experiment they found that originality scores were correlated 
with the use of particular strategies; this sort of planning and strategizing is typically associated with 
executive or prefrontal processes.  In the second experiment, participants were asked after completing the 
task to indicate which responses were perceived as being new to them and which were perceived as being 
old.  Results of regression analyses suggested that letter fluency was positively related to fluency of new 
responses and category fluency was positively related to fluency of old responses.  They interpreted these 
results by first suggesting that letter fluency more heavily loads on executive processes than category 
fluency and then suggesting that fluency of new ideas on DT tasks is thus more heavily correlated with 
executive processes. 
Nusbaum and Silvia (2011) employed latent variable analysis in order to take a different 
analytical approach to the long-standing debate in creativity research about the relationship between 
creativity and intelligence.  Their paper reports the results of two studies with DT scores for unusual uses 
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tasks.  In the first study (n = 226), they found that fluid intelligence was moderately related to DT 
performance, and also that this relationship was mediated by executive shifting (measured here as the 
number of different categories generated on the DT task).  In the second study (n = 188), the researchers 
gave some of the participants a strategy to help them with the DT task.  Fluid intelligence was again 
measured, and they found that, for participants with higher fluid intelligence scores, having access to the 
strategy improved DT, but having the strategy did not make a difference for those lower in fluid 
intelligence.  They ultimately concluded that fluid intelligence, executive switching, and strategy use are 
all central to DT performance, implying that the prevailing view that creativity and intelligence are 
relatively distinct constructs be revised.  To them, DT is an executive-heavy process. 
Insight.  A subset of convergent thinking, insight is clearly related to the stages of incubation and 
illumination in Wallas (1926), and it is commonly recognized as the “ah-ha” moment when a creative 
idea is generated – though, it may also incorporate divergent and associative processes, either consciously 
or unconsciously, to arrive at that moment.  Dietrich (2004) explicitly recognized this part of creative 
cognition in his neurocognitive framework as spontaneous processing, also related to discussions of 
implicit or unconscious thinking, and Dietrich and Kanso (2010) recognized that this convergent process 
is crucial to understanding the neurocognitive foundations of creativity.  Lee and Therriault (2013) 
considered this a convergent thinking dimension of creativity, while also noting that this aspect of 
creative cognition receives far less research attention than DT.  Some of the tasks which have been used 
to assess this part of creative cognition include the Remote Associates Test (RAT), as well as different 
insight problems (sometimes commonly referred to as riddles or “brain teasers”; Lee & Therriault, 2013).  
Common to these various tasks is the requirement for participants to go beyond the immediately obvious 
in order to ultimately generate a novel, less obvious – yet appropriate – solution. (i.e., to overcome initial 
ambiguity in problem solving).  Solutions are not arrived at by explicit, analytical, or strategic paths. 
Lv (2015) examined insight problem solving and suggested that different executive functions 
influence different portions of the insight problem solving process.  Two experiments were conducted, 
each with about 100 participants; the first explored verbal insight problem solving and the second spatial 
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insight problem solving.  A think-aloud protocol was employed so that the researcher could use verbal 
cues from participants to later analyze different stages of the problem solving process.  The two stages 
identified in this study were the initial searching stage followed by a restructuring stage.  (That the insight 
problem solving process might be meaningfully separated into stages could give support for a stage view 
of creative thought like Wallas’ [1926], as well as for the creative cognition viewpoint [Finke, Ward, & 
Smith, 1992] that broader creative processes can be examined in terms of their sub-processes.)  In 
addition to solving the insight problems, participants were also asked to perform a series of working 
memory span and inhibition tasks.  Lv found that working memory was mainly associated with the initial 
searching phase while inhibition was primarily associated with the restructuring phase.   
It is worth making a distinction here between cognitive control and inhibitory control, because, 
particularly in the context of creative cognition, they are not the same.  Simply, inhibitory control is a 
specific, narrower instance of cognitive control.  Whereas inhibitory control generally suggests control 
with inhibiting a particular cognitive response, cognitive control has a broader connotation for a person’s 
ability to executively control many different cognitive processes.  For example, cognitive control could 
also mean controlling disinhibition; that is, cognitive control is not necessarily just the opposite of 
disinhibition, as inhibition is.  This is particularly crucial in the field of creativity because some have 
implicated flow-like, unconscious, or deregulated attention states as important for some creative processes 
(e.g. Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Limb & Braun, 2008).  Indeed, McPherson and Limb (2013) noted the 
importance of controlling flow-like, disinhibited states for expert jazz improvisational musicians.  
Therefore, cognitive control can mean both inhibiting usual responses in a divergent thinking task in order 
to generate more creative ideas, but also controlling disinhibition in order to engage flow-like states and 
unconscious processes in an insight task. 
Though Lv (2015) reported finding a connection between working memory and insight problem 
solving, the issue is far from settled in the research base.  In a series of experiments (DeCaro, Van 
Stockum Jr., & Wieth, 2016) and back-and-forth commentaries (Chuderski & Jastrzebski, 2017; DeCaro, 
Van Stockum Jr., & Wieth, 2017), two research groups presented inconsistent claims about whether 
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higher working memory capacity or lower working memory capacity aids insight problem solving, as 
well as whether or not the level of working memory capacity considered beneficial might depend on 
aspects and stages of the problem-solving process.   
One other example implicating executive and prefrontal functioning in insight comes from a pair 
of experiments conducted by Cerruti and Schlaug (2008).  Based on previous findings demonstrating that 
transcranial direct current stimulation on specific parts of the brain had behavioral performance effects on 
tasks that substantially drew from that stimulated portion, they hypothesized that stimulation of a certain 
region of the prefrontal cortex implicated in verbal task performance might improve performance on the 
RAT.  Support for this hypothesis came from evidence that the RAT is both a complex verbal task and 
also substantially reliant on executive abilities.  Their hypothesis was supported:  anodal stimulation 
within the prefrontal cortex improved RAT performance.  However, even given the intriguing findings 
from this collection of studies, more work is clearly needed to clarify the nuances of how insight is related 
to particular executive functions. 
Associative processing.  Mednick’s (1962) foundational work suggests associative processing as 
another important creative cognitive skill.  This skill is characterized by the particular chain of ideas that 
is generated by a person; or, how fluent one is in retrieving ideas from their associative memory network.  
Wallas (1926) recognized the importance of these associative processes in the preparation and incubation 
stages, where ideas associated with a problem are initially explored explicitly and then unconsciously, 
respectively.  Dietrich (2004) included the associative memory networks of the brain as a key part of his 
neurocognitive framework.  There is some empirical evidence supporting the importance of associative 
processing for performance on measures of creativity (e.g., Lee & Therriault, 2013); however, others have 
suggested the role of associative processing in creative behavior to be modest at best, instead emphasizing 
executive processes that help a person navigate their associative networks in ways conducive to creative 
behavior (e.g., Benedek & Neubauer, 2013).  This skill is often assessed by providing a person with an 
anchor prompt (e.g., a letter of the alphabet) and asking them to generate as many related ideas, or 
associations, as possible, with higher fluency scores (i.e., appropriate responses generated) indicating 
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greater skill.  Measures like the RAT may also tax this skill insofar as it – and others – require 
successfully navigating a chain of associations in order to arrive at a solution. 
While addressing the broader issue of domain-specificity versus -generality in creative 
performance on divergent thinking tests, Diakidoy and Spanoudis (2002) present findings which are 
relevant to the importance of associative processing.  Specifically, by comparing student performance on 
content-general and content-specific divergent thinking measures, across various types of divergent 
thinking tasks, they concluded that there are likely general cognitive processes underlying all divergent 
thinking performance, as well as content- and task-specific factors.  For example, they suggested that the 
knowledge associations activated on a particular task may play a role in mediating divergent thinking 
performance.  That is, the associative knowledge structure may interact with general divergent thinking 
skills in producing creative performance.  Dai and colleagues (2012) also reported some evidence of task-
specificity across their different DT tasks. 
Mentioned briefly above, Benedek and Neubauer (2013)’s study sheds light on the relative 
importance of memory and executive functions in associative processing.  The aim of their study was to 
empirically test specific hypotheses derived from Mednick’s (1962) associative account of creative 
cognition.  A continuous free word association task was used in order to examine whether the chain of 
associations generated by more creative participants (as measured by divergent thinking performance and 
self-reports) was “flatter”: that is, the ideas generated in association with an anchor prompt were 
relatively equal in their strength of association to the prompt.  They reasoned that these flatter associative 
hierarchies should result in more creative people generating a steady stream of responses throughout the 
task since the ideas are associated to the prompt with roughly the same strength (and thus might be 
accessed similarly).  This in contrast with less creative individuals who were hypothesized to trail off 
after initial, dominant ideas are generated because subsequent ideas associated with the prompt are less 
strongly associated.  It was also hypothesized that, overall, more creative people should generate more 
novel responses because their associations tend to be of similar dominance throughout the hierarchies, 
facilitating access to ideas based off a prompt that are less easy to access (due to weaker strength of 
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association) for less creative individuals.  Ultimately, they found that the shapes of the associative 
hierarchies, in terms of the associative strengths of successive responses, was not as important in 
distinguishing the creative from the less creative.  Rather, it was the ability of the creative individuals to 
process the associative hierarchies which was more important; the more creative individuals were able to 
more fluently move through associative chains and thus also generate rarer responses.  Discussing their 
results, they hypothesized that executive processes such as inhibitory control may play an important role 
in associative processing – and ultimately creative thinking – because this skill may help with inhibiting 
common or already provided responses so that new and perhaps more novel responses can be generated.  
In this sense, inhibitory control allows a person to break from a sequence of perseveration, a crucial skill 
for creative behavior.  This is similar to what was suggested by Dietrich (2004): executive and prefrontal 
functioning are crucial for processing associative memories and ultimately yielding creative cognition. 
Simultaneously considering divergent thinking, insight problem solving, and associative 
processing to explore creative cognition.  Lee and Therriault (2013) provide an example of how all 
three skills discussed here (i.e., divergent thinking, insight problem solving, and associative processing) 
might be simultaneously considered.  They conducted a latent variable analysis in order to explore the 
roles of various cognitive underpinnings of the creative process.  Specifically, they examined the roles 
that working memory and intelligence played in associative fluency, divergent thinking, and insight.  
Their rationale for choosing to examine these three creative constructs as cognitive underpinnings of 
creative thought was founded in their literature review suggesting that these three are among the most 
well-established (as we similarly argue here).  They specifically mentioned that it is problematic to reduce 
a complex process like creative cognition to just divergent thinking, as is often done in creativity research.  
Multiple indicators of creative cognition are needed, not the least because they end up providing empirical 
evidence in their study that insight and divergent thinking are rather statistically distinct parts of the 
creative process.  In their sample of 265 participants, Lee and Therriault (2013) found evidence which 
they concluded suggests a distinct pattern amongst the various cognitive constructs:  first, associative 
fluency contributes to both divergent thinking and insight performance; and, second, both working 
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memory and intelligence explain variance in the creative cognitive abilities, though primarily through 
associative fluency.  Thus, working memory is an important cognitive foundation – though perhaps in 
different ways – for three creative cognitive skills.  They ended by explicitly calling for more research 
exploring the relationships among granular cognitive processes underlying creative cognition. 
There are opportunities to improve upon and expand the work of Lee and Therriault (2013).  For 
example, the theoretical and empirical background they provided in their article suggests that, not only 
working memory, but also other executive functions (e.g., inhibitory control and executive shifting) might 
play a role in the different creative processes.  It should be equally important to understand the 
relationships of these other executive functions to different creative cognitive skills.  Also, they used what 
is termed a snapshot scoring method for one of the divergent thinking tasks, a method which has been 
evaluated by Silvia, Martin, and Nusbaum (2009).  Silvia and colleagues suggested that this method may 
not be the optimal choice when divergent thinking is a crucial, focal construct being studied, particularly 
because the more time-intensive scoring methods (discussed elsewhere) may be more reliable.  Finally, 
though they provide a strong rationale for conducting a latent variable analysis, it is not always clear that 
the goodness of fit statistics were properly interpreted.  For example, it has been suggested that acceptable 
root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), confirmatory fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis index 
(TLI), and standardized root-mean square residual (SRMR) values of between .05 and .08, above 0.90, 
above 0.90, and less than 0.05, respectively, suggest adequate model fit (Schumacker & Lomax, 2016).  
Fit indices for their final, accepted model (RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.82, TLI = 0.79, and SRMR = 0.06; p. 
313) do not necessarily suggest adequate fit.  Given these issues, some of the relationships amongst the 
cognitive constructs which they found need to be replicated.  Regardless, given the complexity of the 
cognitive process of creativity demonstrated in the work cited above, it is evident that multiple parts of 
that process should be studied simultaneously.   
The state of the research regarding executive functioning and creative cognition.  
Considering all of these creative neurocognitive findings as a whole, it is important to simultaneously 
appreciate the impressive empirical advances that have increased our understanding of creative cognition, 
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while also tempering this appreciation with an honest assessment of what can actually be said at this point 
in the development of the field.  The above studies provide some evidence that creativity is reliant upon 
executive and prefrontal functions.  Some executive functions have been offered in particular, such as 
working memory, inhibitory control, and shifting.  Though, these suggestions are just as often based in 
untested hypotheses and theories as they are in empirical findings.  The evidence implicating prefrontal 
neural functioning is more ambiguous; though the prefrontal cortex is consistently noted as being 
important in neuroscientific studies, the mechanisms are not at all clear at this point.  Indeed, some 
researchers have pointed out that the evidence to date concerning the neural underpinnings of creativity 
remains largely ambiguous (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Haier & Jung, 2008; Jung & Ryman, 2013; 
Kaufman et al., 2010).   
Perhaps because of this largely unexplored research terrain, Silvia (2011) has called for more 
work that does not simply use measures indicating creativity – like divergent thinking assessments – as 
outcomes, but also as means for revealing more specific cognitive processes that might underlie creative 
cognition.  In particular, and as an example, he hypothesized that certain executive functions might be 
differentially important for different types of divergent thinking tasks, but more work is needed in order 
to begin to establish such cognitive underpinnings. 
McPherson and Limb (2013) tried to offer a partial explanation for why this ambiguity 
characterizes the current state of research by briefly exploring some of the inherent difficulties in trying to 
study creativity from a neuroscientific perspective, with the scientific method.  For example, they noted 
that the novelty associated with creativity makes it difficult to capture and examine systematically.  They 
also presented a sort of paradoxical idea:  because creativity is such a complex phenomenon, it might be 
difficult to examine in smaller parts without then missing the synergy that might result in creative 
thought; conversely, without looking at such smaller pieces of creativity, it may be too unwieldy a 
construct to examine at all.  It may simply be that creative cognition is not as neatly localizable as other 
neurocognitive functions, as Dietrich and colleagues have suggested (Dietrich, 2004; Dietrich & Kanso, 
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2010).  However, McPherson and Limb are quick to counter that it is imperative that valid scientific 
means are used to study creativity given its central importance to human existence and societal progress.   
So, while this line of research is far from conclusive, it is noteworthy that executive and 
prefrontal functioning are often found to be associated with particular creative cognitive skills.  
Furthermore, more substantial evidence has already been reviewed above documenting the associations 
between SES and executive and prefrontal functioning.  Thus, the evidence from both lines of research is 
substantial enough to warrant an examination of the connections amongst all three constructs – 
particularly regarding how any relationships between SES and creative cognition might be mediated by 
executive and prefrontal functioning.   
Creativity and Socioeconomic Status 
Arguments have been made on largely theoretical and hypothetical grounds that creativity may be 
related to the immediate social and economic context in which a child develops.  For example, in their 
review of what creativity research has revealed about the constraints that might be placed on creativity, 
Sternberg and Kaufman (2010) mentioned resource constraints.  They presented the idea that children 
from lower income families or who have grown up in adverse environmental conditions may display a 
different type of creativity – not necessarily better or worse – than children from more affluent and less 
adverse upbringings; the opportunities to develop and demonstrate creativity may not be the same.  Russ 
and Fiorelli (2010) emphasized the importance of play and child rearing conditions for the development 
of creativity in early childhood.  Among others, Lareau (2011) has documented extensively how such 
developmental opportunities are unequally related to social class.  As already noted, Kuhn and Holling 
(2009) used multilevel modeling in an educational context to explore divergent thinking.  Importantly 
here, the contextual findings from their study, made possible by the multilevel modeling, suggested the 
importance of childhood SES.  While they did not analyze the relationship between divergent thinking 
and student SES directly, they did note the importance of the classroom context (which is likely 
correlated with student SES), given their finding that divergent thinking performance varied meaningfully 
across classrooms in the study.  In fact, one of their suggestions for future research was to more explicitly 
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model and account for the social contextual influences in students’ lives bearing on their divergent 
thinking and other creative abilities. 
These theoretical arguments notwithstanding, there is limited empirical evidence suggesting any 
systematic connections between SES and creativity, particularly from a neurocognitive perspective.  
Several studies in the 1970s and 1980s explored certain aspects of an SES-creativity relationship.  For 
example, in response to a perceived negative tone in testing research at the time due to issues surrounding 
testing bias, Torrance (1973) provided a checklist to help identify creative talent in historically 
disadvantaged populations, including minority students and students from lower SES backgrounds.  In a 
review by Torrance (1971) published two years prior, he examined seven administrations of the Torrance 
Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT) that also measured SES, yielding mixed findings.  Certain subtests in 
some studies showed an advantage for higher SES students, some showed no difference, and still others 
showed an advantage for lower SES students, particularly on the verbal subtests. 
Bashaw and White (1971) found that their sample of 277 low-SES kindergarteners performed at 
the norm for their age on the TTCT figural creativity tasks.  Examining a creativity training intervention, 
Anastasi (1970) found evidence of its efficacy for only higher SES students.  In the same study, in a 
section pertaining to the biographical correlates of creativity among high school students, many of the 
home environment factors which differentiated the creative from the non-creative are commonly 
associated today with SES (e.g., parental educational levels).  Ward, Kogan, and Pankove (1972) found 
that student SES did not predict the psychometric properties of or fluency scores on their divergent 
thinking measures.  In Milgram’s (1981) examination of creative problem solving, she found that higher 
SES students were more likely to provide appropriate, novel, and original solutions to insight problems.  
Finally, in one other study of this time period, Haley (1984) examined socioeconomic status relative to 
creative response styles, or the modes of expressing responses to divergent thinking tasks.  Higher SES 
students had higher fluency and originality scores using verbal expression, whereas lower SES students 
had better scores using kinetic expression and integrative expression.  (Of note, all students in their 
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sample were Black, so SES was not confounded by race.  Such findings provide support for 
environmental – rather than heritable – influences on creative cognition.) 
It is clear, however, that none of these research studies had the benefit of the state of 
contemporary neurocognitive knowledge to inform their pursuits.  Creative cognition was not yet 
theorized and, if it even existed, neurocognitive knowledge regarding creativity was in its infancy.  
Furthermore, in getting at the broad question as to whether or not there may be a relationship between 
SES and creativity, these studies often under-theorized and inadequately measured SES.  For example, 
though labeled SES in some studies, the construct was operationalized by a district or school indicator of 
disadvantage, such as participation in the NSLP.  They often similarly equated creativity solely with 
divergent thinking.  Another non-trivial concern with these studies is the explicit deficit language used in 
some of them.  For example, one need only look to the title of Bashaw and White (1971)’s study: Figural 
Creativity and Convergent Thinking Among Culturally Deprived Kindergarten Children.  Anastasi (1970) 
refers to the two levels of socioeconomic status in her study as “culturally disadvantaged and middle-
class” (p. 27).  As the learner profile, non-deficit view of creative cognition proposed here suggests, 
considering one group more disadvantaged – as opposed to having a different cognitive adaptation to their 
developmental environment – may be problematic for research and educational practice. 
In a more recent study, employing a sample of 1,445 children, Dudek, Strobel, and Runco (1993) 
examined, among others, the relationships between figural and verbal performance on the Torrance Tests 
of Creative Thinking and SES.  Their rationale for examining this relationship was based upon prior 
mixed findings regarding creativity and childhood SES (some of which have already been reviewed 
above).  Further, they had aims similar to ours:  namely, that if SES is an important consideration for 
creativity, it should be empirically demonstrated.  They found a consistent positive relationship between 
SES and performance across all four divergent thinking scoring dimensions (i.e., fluency, originality, 
flexibility, and elaboration) on both verbal and figural versions of the test, and, while gender, grade, and 
SES all accounted for relatively little of the variance in divergent thinking scores overall, SES did explain 
more than the other two.  Importantly, their study was limited to divergent thinking – not a larger battery 
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of creative cognitive measures – and SES was conceived of as a group measure (i.e., low, middle, or high) 
at the school district level. 
In an examination of possible ethnic differences in creative performance amongst a sample from 
Minnesota, Bart, Hokanson, Sahin, and Abdelsamea (2016) found differences in performance on the 
Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking Figural A version by race and ethnicity.  Specifically, Black children 
in the sample scored lower than their White or Asian Pacific counterparts.  Notably, the authors suggested 
that environmental differences – such as SES – could account for such differences, but student SES was 
not considered in this study. 
Finally, in perhaps one of the most recent and relevant studies, Dai et al. (2012) explored the 
relationships between SES (as operationalized by NSLP participation at the district level and parental 
education at the student level) and three measures related to creativity: divergent thinking, self-reported 
creative personality traits, and self-reported perceptions of support for developing creative traits from 
teachers and parents.  In their review of prior literature, they stated that not much work had been done on 
this particular question, perhaps because creative ability – unlike ELA or math achievement, for example 
– is normally only treated as an individual difference, as opposed to a possible group difference.  
However, they asserted that the potential policy implications for a creativity “gap” are perhaps as 
important as the long-standing inequalities in academic achievement.  In their sample of 229 eighth 
graders, they reported evidence of differences in creativity by SES (for both their student- and district-
level measures), specifically in terms of their composite measure of divergent thinking, which they 
concluded provides evidence for an SES-creativity “gap.”  Looking at possible mediators using stepwise 
regression, they also provided evidence that academic achievement and cognitive motivation may have 
mediated this relationship.  A strength of this study was its ability to consider contextual SES influences 
by looking at both parental SES background and NSLP at the school district level. 
However, while this study is an important step in investigating the relationship between SES and 
creativity, there are ways to improve upon it and further contribute to this area of inquiry.  First, this study 
was conducted with an adolescent sample.  There is ample evidence for other educational outcomes that 
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relationships with SES are present earlier in childhood, and that earlier interventions might thus prove 
more fruitful.  Similar research on a younger sample is needed here.  Second, though they employed 
multiple measures contributing to a broad conception of creativity, these measures do not encompass all 
of what creativity is, even though the language employed by the authors often suggests that, nor do they 
seek to speak broadly to one aspect of creativity (e.g., a cognitive component).  It is important to 
explicitly establish what part of the broad creativity construct is being measured, in a theoretically sound 
manner, in order to build upon and complement this research.  Third, they only included parental 
educational attainment (dichotomized from four possible survey responses) as an indicator of student-
level SES.  While this is an important indicator, it is not recommended as a sole indicator, and so this 
measure can be improved upon by adding other indicators, such as household income and parental 
occupation. 
Taken together, these studies demonstrate that there are mixed findings regarding SES and 
measures of creativity, as well as opportunities to improve and expand upon this foundation.  These 
studies do not approach the relationships between SES and creativity from a neurocognitive framework, 
which might be a novel and beneficial approach by which to examine the topic and unpack the mixed 
findings to date.  Further, the measures of creativity and SES were not consistently approached with an 
adequate theoretical base, matched with valid operationalizations that measured the particular constructs 
purporting to be measured.   
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
When we weaved these various research strands together, certain research questions and testable 
hypotheses, consistent with an overarching neurocognitive theoretical framework, emerges.  On the one 
hand, student SES consistently predicts numerous educational outcomes, though the results concerning 
creativity are as of yet mixed.  On a neurocognitive level, student SES predicts differential functioning in 
specific executive and prefrontal functions, and specific executive and prefrontal functions, in turn, are 
thought to underlie different aspects of creative cognition.  Therefore, it is reasonable to explore the 
extent to which student SES ultimately predicts creative cognition through a neurocognitive lens, both on 
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the basis that this is another important educational outcome for which evidence of any inequities should 
be demonstrated, and because there is neurocognitive evidence suggesting that executive and prefrontal 
functioning might mediate the influence of or interact with SES on creative cognition.  Work exploring all 
three constructs simultaneously may lead to a richer understanding of the creative cognitive profiles of 
students from different socioeconomic environments. 
Three research questions guided our extension and integration of these various research 
literatures.   
1. Does student SES predict the creative cognitive skills of associative processing, insight problem 
solving, or divergent thinking?  We hypothesized that there would be an overall positive 
relationship between SES and creative cognitive skills; though, there would be a different profile 
of creative cognitive strengths for students from different SES contexts.     
2. How are specific executive functioning skills related to each of the creative cognitive skills?   We 
hypothesized that the executive functioning skills of working memory, inhibitory control, and 
shifting would be differentially related to the creative cognitive skills: working memory would be 
positively related to all three creative measures, and cognitive control and shifting would be 
particularly important for divergent thinking and insight.  That is, all three creative cognitive 
measures would depend upon the ability to hold and process information in consciousness; 
however, the abilities to inhibit prepotent ideas and flexibly shift to other ideas would be 
particularly important for having higher fluency and originality in divergent thinking, on the one 
hand, and moving past obvious solutions to arrive at insights, on the other. 
3. To what degree are relationships between student SES and each of the creative cognitive skills 
mediated by or in interaction with each executive skill?  We hypothesized that some of the 
variance in relationships between SES and each of the creative cognitive measures would be 
mediated by executive skills; though, the amount explainable for each creative cognitive skill 
would vary depending upon the differential recruitment of the executive skills, as illuminated in 
the answer to the prior question.  Furthermore, we expected to see an even more complete, but 
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In order to determine the appropriate sample size needed to detect the hypothesized SES 
associations with the cognitive variables, STATA 13.1 was used to conduct power analyses.  Using 
regression analyses, Noble, McCandliss, and Farah (2007) found statistically significant beta values for 
SES predicting cognitive control and working memory of 0.23 and 0.24, respectively, with a total sample 
of 150 children.  This study and these effects are fairly typical of other findings in the field.  To detect a 
similar effect size, with 0.70 power at an alpha level of 0.05, a sample of approximately 110 participants 
would be needed.       
We recruited from three different sources to obtain a targeted primary-aged sample of this size 
with the needed SES variability for this study.  All were located in the Baltimore Metropolitan Area at the 
time of the study.  Thirty-nine participants were recruited from a tuition-based summer program for 
advanced learners.  These students generally represent a middle- to high-SES population, although 
financial aid is provided to some students.  An additional 70 participants were recruited from an 
extracurricular enrichment program in under-resourced community public schools, designed for advanced 
learners.  These students tend to have lower SES but represent the same high academic potential as the 
summer program students.  Finally, 15 participants were recruited from the general community.   
Though this sampling strategy, rooted in different program types, was designed to capitalize upon 
likely SES variability, we did not expect these different program types to yield a sample systematically 
different on other important variables that might affect our analyses of executive and creative cognitive 
skills.  We did not hypothesize, for example, that program differences in variables unrelated to SES 
would differ systematically by program type and predict either executive or creative cognitive skills.  We 
did hypothesize that common correlates of SES would differ by site, such as urbanicity or race and 
ethnicity; however, such variables are not here hypothesized to relate to executive or creative cognitive 
skills apart from their relationships with SES.  While there is evidence that both executive and creative 
cognitive skills can be deliberately intervened upon and trained in order to improve performance (as was 
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reviewed in the prior chapter), such interventions were not part of the curricula at either program type and 
we have no knowledge of their systematic, differential use.  Indeed, one of the aims for the relatively 
newer extracurricular enrichment program was to provide content and development opportunities similar 
to those that have been provided for much longer historically in the tuition-based summer programs.   
Seventeen participants (11 enrichment, three summer, and three community) were excluded.  One 
observation was removed a priori because this participant was 15 years of age, whereas the remainder of 
the sample was between the ages of seven and 13 – the range associated with primary education which is 
the focus of this investigation.  The other 16 participants excluded from analyses were removed because 
they were missing observations on measures crucial to answering the research questions.  Fourteen 
participants were missing all three indicators of SES1, one participant was missing a Digit Span 
Backwards score, and one participant was missing a Symbol-Digit Modalities score.  This yielded a final 
analytical sample of 108 participants. 
Measures 
To help guide the discussion of measures and analyses, Table 3.1 organizes the constructs studied 
and the measures operationalizing those constructs.   
 
1 Additional analyses were conducted to see if these 16 students were different in important ways from the remaining students 






Constructs and Measures 
Construct  Measure(s) Possible score range 
Socioeconomic status Guardian survey NA 
Executive functioning   
 Working memory Digit Span Backwards task 0 – 9 
 Cognitive control Go-No-Go task 0 – 10  
 Executive shifting Color-Shape Shifting task NA 
Creative cognitiona   
 Divergent thinking Instances task NA 
  Unusual Uses task NA 
 Insight Insight word problems 0 – 4  
  Remote Associates Test itemsb 0 – 16  
  Word scramble items 0 – 16  
 Associative processing Letter and category task 0 – 26  
Demographics and controls   
 Demographics Student survey NA 
 Processing speed Symbol-Digit Modalities task 0 – 110 
Note. NA = not applicable to these measures since there were not predefined possible ranges.  aAll 
creative cognitive measures were contained within a single battery packet, the Flexibility in Thinking 
(FIT) measure; bRemote Associates Test items likely also tax associative processing and so, while they 
are categorized under insight, there is likely cross-over in also indicating associative processing. 
 
Creative cognition.  The Flexibility in Thinking (FIT) measure, crafted at our research lab, 
contains verbal measures of associative processing, divergent thinking, and insight, and it was used to 
assess the creative cognitive skills being studied here.  This paper-and-pencil measure was first piloted on 
children with participants from both day-site and after-school programs during the summer and fall of 
2015.  There are two parallel forms, such that the format (e.g., number of items, item types, etc.) is the 
same, while the content of the items differs on each form.  
Divergent thinking Instances and Unusual Uses tasks.  Two types of items from the FIT were 
used to measure DT.  There is an Instances item (e.g., “Name all of the square things that you can think 
of”) and an Unusual Uses item (e.g., “Name all of the uses for a brick you can think of”).  In an 
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examination of reliability of scoring methods for different types of DT tasks, Silvia (2011) found Unusual 
Uses tasks to be the most reliable, followed by Instances tasks, which were moderately reliable, 
employing the maximal-reliability H statistic with subjective scoring (i.e., responses were assessed by 
raters, as opposed to objective scoring, in which responses might simply be counted or compared for 
relative frequency within the sample).  Each participant was presented with two DT items, one of each of 
these types.  Participants completed each item separately, with two minutes to complete each.  
Participants were explicitly instructed to come up with as many unique answers to each prompt as 
possible, and, because this was explicitly instructed, these tasks were likely well-suited to capture 
maximal DT skills, as opposed to typical skills (Silvia, 2011; Silvia, Martin, & Nusbaum, 2009).  That is, 
the participants were explicitly told to try to be unique, which is thought to measure something different 
than when the instructions to the task simply ask participants to generate responses. 
Researchers have proposed many different methods for scoring DT tasks (e.g., Kaufman, Plucker, 
& Russell, 2012; Plucker & Makel, 2010; Plucker, Qian, & Wang, 2011; Silvia, 2011; Silvia, Martin, & 
Nusbaum, 2009).  As noted already, these tasks are typically scored along any of four dimensions: 
fluency, originality, flexibility, and elaboration.  Runco (2010) notes the importance of including as many 
of these dimensions in a research study with DT as possible because each may provide somewhat unique 
information; other researchers note the high correlation between fluency and originality as a justification 
for solely using one or the other.  For this study, participants’ responses were scored for fluency and 
originality to balance including multiple information points regarding participant DT skills with the 
efficiency of objective scoring (which, as is described further below, would be considerably less efficient 
with the inclusion of the other two dimensions).  In particular, scoring a category dimension would 
introduce a substantial amount of subjectivity to the dataset at a particularly high cost to the practicability 
of completing the study in a timely manner.  There are also far fewer examples of category scoring 
available in the empirical literature upon which to build. 
Several replicable steps were taken in order to prepare participants’ pencil-and-paper responses 
for fluency and originality scoring.  First, any duplicate responses within a participant’s response set for a 
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specific item were removed.  For example, if in response to the circle Instances prompt a participant 
wrote “ball” twice, only one was counted.  A second category of data cleaning included removing the 
words “the,” “a,” “an,” as well as “to” and “as” when they led any of the unusual uses responses.  For 
example, a response of “to break a piece of glass” in response to the Unusual Uses for a brick prompt 
would become “break piece of glass.”  A response of “a circle” for the round Instances prompt became 
“circle.” There were a few instances in which the entire response was surrounded in parentheses; these 
were removed.  Symbols used in place of words (e.g., “#” instead of “number”) were changed to their 
word equivalent.  Finally, responses were corrected for spelling and capitalization, and compound words 
were standardized to match use throughout (e.g., “head phones” and “headphones” were both 
standardized as “headphones”).   
Table 3.2 quantifies the extent to which responses were standardized due to each of the 
abovementioned procedures.  This table shows that almost 80% of the responses provided by participants 
were analyzed as originally written by the participant.  All of the responses provided by 18 participants 
were analyzed as written.  An additional 39 only needed one or two responses transformed.  On the high 
end of the transformation range, six participants required between ten and 16 transformations.  Of the 
remaining fifth of responses requiring some sort of transformation prior to analysis, the largest category 
consisted of corrections for spelling (as might be expected for the age of this sample), followed by the 





DT Response Standardization Statistics for All Responses (n = 2,116) 
Type of Response Transformation Count Percentage 
None – analyzed response matched participant’s original 1,682 79.49% 
One transformation from original to analyzed response   
 Compound standardization 28 1.32% 
 Parentheses surrounding entire response removed 1 0.05% 
 Punctuation corrected 4 0.19% 
 “a” removed from response 93 4.40% 
 “an” removed from response 3 0.14% 
 “the” removed from response 12 0.57% 
 “to” removed from beginning of response 43 2.03% 
 Spelling corrected 188 8.88% 
 Symbol transformed to word form 1 0.05% 
Two or three transformations needed to arrive at analyzed response 61 2.88% 
Note. One other category not represented in any of the one-transformation responses but included in 
those responses needing two or three transformations was Capitalization (e.g., proper nouns).  It was 
frequently the case that a participant misspelled and did not capitalize a proper noun, such as “Rubick’s 
Cube” – a particularly popular choice for the square Instances item. 
 
All of these steps were taken because they could be easily replicated as an objective method of 
scoring these DT tasks and they seemed to get at the essence of differentiating answers beyond superficial 
distinctions (e.g., the presence or absence of “a”).  Resulting responses were judged for their 
appropriateness in addressing the prompt by considering response completeness (i.e., whether or not a 
complete word or thought was expressed) and a liberal threshold for being deemed appropriate (i.e., the 
above procedures resulted in a response that could be corrected).  These criteria resulted in 16 responses – 
0.76% of all responses – not marked as appropriate (and thus excluded from subsequent scoring) by 14 
participants. 
Once the DT responses were in a scoreable form, we calculated each participant’s fluency score 
as the sum of their appropriate responses on each item.  Then, following Plucker, Qian, and Wang (2011), 
originality was scored according to a percentage method.  This method was chosen in an attempt to isolate 
originality from fluency as much as possible, while simultaneously maximizing validity and reliability.  
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Per the subjective-objective distinction noted above, this is considered an objective way of scoring 
originality.  Each response from each participant was given one point if it was provided by less than 5% 
of the sample and zero points otherwise.  Then to arrive at an originality percentage that attempted to 
control for the influence of fluency, the participant’s total originality points were divided by their total 
fluency score to arrive at their final originality score.  This method of evaluating subjects’ originality is 
dependent upon sample size – an oft-cited criticism, however, given the exploratory nature of the research 
and the moderate sample size, this should not be a major concern, particularly in conjunction with fluency 
also being considered (Silvia, Martin, & Nusbaum, 2009).    
Insight Problems.  There was a set of four insight problems (i.e., riddles, or “brain teasers”) in 
order to assess insight.  Participants had four minutes to complete as many as possible, with each correct 
response given one point.   
Remote Associates Test items.  A set of 16 items mirroring items from the Remote Associates 
Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962) were used to assess both insight and associative processing.  These items 
consisted of three words that were superficially unrelated but could be connected by the relation of each 
to a fourth word.  As an example, an item might have the three words “political / surprise / line” with the 
correct response being “party” (i.e., political party, surprise party, and party line).  Participants were 
given three minutes to complete as many as possible, with each correct response given one point.   
Word Scramble items.  Sixteen word scramble items were used to assess insight.  Each problem 
consisted of one word with the letters arranged out of their proper order, and the participant had to write 
the word with the letters arranged in the correct order (e.g., “tebl” might become “belt”).  Words were 
selected from the level one (roughly equivalent to first grade) assessments of the Qualitative Reading 
Inventory-5 (QRI-5; Leslie & Caldwell, 2011) in order to ensure that the words would be recognizable for 
this age group; that is, this method of choosing words should mean that familiarity with the unscrambled 
words would be less of a confound for task performance.  Participants were given three minutes to 
complete as many as possible, with each correct response given one point. 
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Alphabetical-Categorical fluency task.  To assess associative processing, an item containing 26 
answer response spaces, one beginning with each letter of the alphabet, was given to the participant.  One 
version of the FIT asked the participant to fill in as many response spaces as possible with fruits or 
vegetables and the other version asked for animals.  This task captures both phonetic and category fluency 
(e.g., Lee & Therriault, 2013).   
Digit Span Backwards task.  A Digit Span Backwards task (modeled on the Digit Span task 
from Wechsler, 2014) was used to assess working memory, in which each participant was read aloud a 
sequence of numbers and then was asked to repeat those number back in reverse order, thus requiring 
short-term memory of the numbers and the ability to manipulate the numbers simultaneously.  There was 
a practice trial with two 2-digit sequences and then the part of the task that was scored began with two 4-
digit sequences.  The largest sequence correctly repeated back was the participant’s score.  The task ended 
when two sequences of the same length were both incorrectly recalled backwards. 
Go-No-Go task.  A computerized Go-No-Go task assessed inhibitory control, designed based on 
the description of the task used in Noble, McCandliss, and Farah (2007).  This task took about one minute 
to complete and consisted of animal pictures appearing on the computer screen once every second.  The 
participant was asked to press the space key as fast as possible every time she saw an animal – unless that 
animal was a dog.  In total, 60 animals randomly appeared on the screen, 10 of which were dogs.  The 
score used for this task was the number of times the participant did not strike the space key when the dog 
appeared.  Thus, a higher score represents greater inhibitory control because this indicates the number of 
times the participant inhibited a dominant response (i.e., pressing the space bar with the appearance of 
every other animal besides the dog). 
Color-Shape Shifting task.  To capture executive shifting ability, we adapted a test from Mittal 
and colleagues (2015), in which shifting ability is operationalized as the difference between the time it 
takes a participant to repeat a task and the time it takes the participant to shift to a different task.  This 
computerized Color-Shape task proceeded as follows.  The participant was presented with a series of 
trials on a computer screen.  At the top of the screen in each trial was a word indicating the category type 
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(i.e., shape or color) and underneath this word was a colored shape.  The shape was either a circle or a 
triangle and the color was either red or green.  Using two keyboard keys – one with a patch of red and the 
black outline of a circle on a white background, the other with a patch of green and the black outline of a 
triangle on a white background – the participant was tasked with categorizing the colored shape according 
to the category word at the top of the screen.  For example, if the top of the screen read “SHAPE,” the 
participant would hit the key corresponding to a circle or triangle, disregarding its color.  But, when the 
category label changed to “COLOR,” the participant had to pick the key with the color that matched the 
shape, disregarding the shape.  A repeat trial was one in which the category was the same as the prior 
trial, whereas shifting trials were those with a different category from the prior trial.  The average 
difference in response times between accurate responses on these types of trials is thought to suggest the 
participant’s ability to flexibly shift between category types.  The smaller the difference in average 
response times between these trial types, the greater the executive shifting ability and flexibility the 
participant is thought to possess. 
Guardian survey.  We collected several indicators of SES from participants’ guardians using a 
brief, pencil-and-paper survey, which included items asking about the following for all guardians in the 
household: educational attainment level (i.e., the highest degree or certificate completed), work status 
(e.g., full-time or part-time), and occupation.  Additionally, there were items requesting total household 
income in 2015, the total number of people living in the household, and the total number of people living 
in the household under the age of 18.  Occupations were coded for prestige according to the scale created 
by Smith and Son (2014), which is based upon the 2012 General Social Survey.  The occupational 
prestige scores were based on respondents of that scale choosing a perceived prestige rating for an 
occupation on a scale from one to nine.     
Demographic and control variables. In order to understand the demographic composition of our 
sample, as well as to better qualify the relationships amongst SES, executive functioning, and creative 
cognition, several demographic variables and covariates were considered.  There is prior theoretical and 
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empirical work to suggest that some of these variables need to be considered when examining the key 
constructs in this research.   
Symbol-Digit Modalities task.  Researchers using some of the cognitive measures here have 
noted that processing speed plays an important role in task performance on timed tasks (e.g., see the 
review in Kuhn & Holling, 2009), and several of the creative cognitive measures here were timed.  So, 
processing speed was assessed using a Symbol-Digit Modalities measure (Smith, 1973) in which 
participants had 90 seconds to orally complete a sequence of symbols with their corresponding numbers 
based on a key.  The greater the number of correct responses, the greater the processing speed score.   
Student survey.  There is some evidence that certain demographic variables may be related to 
creativity or SES, and thus could account for any relationships found here between these constructs: 
multilingualism (e.g., see the review in Lubart, 2010), gender (e.g., Kuhn & Holling, 2009), age and grade 
level, race and ethnicity (e.g., to avoid construct confounding effects; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002), 
handedness (Shobe, Ross, & Fleck, 2009), and program type (e.g., the immediate testing context may 
impact divergent thinking performance; Kuhn & Holling, 2009).  Therefore, to address possible 
confounding influences and seek to describe our participants, a student survey was used to capture student 
self-responses about each. 
Procedures 
This study was approved by the Homewood Institutional Review Board (HIRB) at Johns Hopkins 
University.  Guardian permission and participant assent was collected for every participant prior to 
participating in the study.  Guardians of the enrichment, school-based participants provided permission 
for their child’s participation as a part of program admission.  All other guardians provided permission 
when their child was recruited.  For all parents and guardians, at the time we obtained permission, we also 
asked them to complete our questionnaire assessing SES.     
The participant measures (i.e., the demographic questionnaire, as well as those assessing 
executive functioning, creative cognition, and processing speed) were completed in individual sessions 
lasting about 40 minutes.  The assessment battery proceeded as follows.  The participant was escorted to a 
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room, in which up to two other participants were simultaneously being tested.  Each participant was 
assessed one-on-one with a researcher.  Every participant began by completing the demographic survey.  
Participants were then presented with each of the cognitive tasks in the battery.  As described in greater 
detail above, the tasks either required the participant to write responses on paper, provide oral responses 
which were recorded by the researcher, or input responses using an Apple laptop computer keyboard.   
Tasks were presented in randomized order; however, for an early subset of participants, 
researchers were given latitude to adjust the order based on the testing conditions.  This practice of 
adjusting order was eliminated partway through the study, and all participants were flagged based on 
whether or not the order was random.  Out of 108 participants, 61 (56.48%) did the tasks in a random 
order (see Table 3.3).  Two-sample t-tests on task performance were used to determine whether those that 
deviated from random differed from the fully randomized group.  These tests were conducted for each of 
the key study variables.  None of the tests were statistically significant at a liberal alpha level of 0.05, so 
task order was not included in further analyses. 
 
Table 3.3 
Proportion of Program Types Receiving Randomized Task Order 
 Randomized Not randomized 
Enrichment 33 26 
Lab 6 7 
Summer  22 14 
 
Upon completing the assessment battery, eligible participants were thanked for their participation 
and given a $10-giftcard or toy of comparable value.  Students in the extra-curricular program were not 
eligible for additional incentives because the testing was part of the program which was already viewed as 
a benefit. 
Statistical Analyses 
The discussion of statistical analyses is broken into four sections: descriptive analyses and 
preparing the analytical dataset; followed by three sections addressing each of the three research 
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questions, respectively.  All analyses were conducted using Stata IC version 13.1, and a study-wide p-
value of 0.05 was established a priori to determine the statistical significance of all results.  However, 
because we conducted a relatively large amount of statistical tests due to the multiple stepwise regression 
strategy, coupled with the number of dependent variables being regressed, each stepwise regression 
model is also corrected with a family-wise error rate based upon the number statistical tests.  This was 
done in order to protect against Type I errors, or the possibility of finding statistically significant results 
as a product of estimating enough statistical parameters – not because the parameter is actually likely to 
be significant in its own right.  As an illustration, in a set of stepwise models examining the predictive 
relationships between SES, covariates, and one of the creative cognitive variables, we assess the statistical 
significance of three covariates in both steps, SES in one step, adjusted R2 values in both models, and the 
change in adjusted R2 values – a total of 10 estimates of statistical significance with which we are 
concerned.  Thus, for this particular model, we would determine whether or not an estimate was 
statistically significant by dividing our study-wide rate of 0.05 by the 10 parameters, resulting in a rate of 
0.005.  Of note, we used alpha levels of 0.05 – and not corrected values – for tests of random task order 
effects or inclusion of covariates, reasoning that a higher alpha level for these tests would favor inclusion 
of any of these important variables that may impact the stepwise regression results. 
Descriptive analyses and preparing the analytical dataset.  We first present descriptive 
statistics for all variables, including means, standard deviations, ranges, and paired correlations.  The 
correlations provide the first bits of evidence for (binary) relationships among the constructs of interest, as 
well as justification for creating any composite variables and the inclusion of covariates in subsequent 
models.   
 Does student SES predict the creative cognitive skills of associative processing, insight 
problem solving, or divergent thinking?  The essence of answering this first research question is 
determining whether or not SES predicts each of the creative cognitive skills – after controlling for select 
covariates.  To statistically address this – and each subsequent – question, stepwise regression methods 
were used.  Here, we estimated a series of two-step regression models, one for each distinct creative 
48 
 
cognitive skill.  In the first step of each model, the creative cognitive skill was regressed solely on SES.  
In the second step, we added covariates.  Interpretations of these models focus on the total variance of 
each creative cognitive skill explained by SES, as well as to what degree the control variables may 
account for any relationships.  Also, the significance and magnitude of the regression coefficients are 
interpreted.  Importantly, in each series of models, the suggestion of any mediation will be investigated by 
examining if any coefficients from key variables in earlier step models decrease with the addition of 
variables in a subsequent step. 
How are working memory, inhibitory control, and shifting related to each of the creative 
cognitive skills?  The analysis strategy here mirrors that from the previous research question.  Each of the 
creative cognitive skills was regressed on the executive functioning measures in two-step models with 
covariates added in the second step.   
To what degree are relationships between student SES and each of the creative cognitive 
skills mediated by or in interaction with each of executive skills?  The final research question was 
aimed at determining the extent to which any relationships between SES and creative cognitive measures 
uncovered in the first research question might be mediated by executive skills.  One way of 
conceptualizing the analyses for this research question is to essentially combine what was done for 
research questions one and two.  Therefore, we continued using the stepwise analytical technique when 
addressing this question, though, the content of the two steps changed:  the first re-stated the relationships 
already noted above between SES, the covariates, and the creative cognitive skills for which significant 
models were identified.  The second step added the three executive skills to demonstrate whether or not 
any of them explained some of the variance accounted for by SES and the covariates. 
Going one step further, this question was also about the profile of executive skills, by student 
SES, predicting each of the creative cognitive skills – something a bit different than mediation, indeed a 
moderation or interaction.  This way of looking at the question gets at the core of the learner profile, non-
deficit approach by considering how student SES and executive skills may interact to predict the creative 
cognitive skills here.  Put another way:  is it possible that students from different socioeconomic 
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backgrounds have different profiles of executive skills predicting different profiles of creative cognitive 
skills?  To address this, a series of three-step regression models were estimated.  In the first step of each 
stepwise regression model, SES and each executive skill were regressed on one of the eight creative 
cognitive skills.  In the second step, interaction terms between SES and each of the executive skills (i.e., 
three additional terms; SES x working memory, SES x shifting, and SES x inhibitory control) were added.  




Descriptive Statistics for Demographic, Control, and SES Measures 
The sample had a mean age of 9.81 years, ranging from seven to 13.  Table 4.1 provides 
descriptive statistics for the nominal demographic variables captured on the student survey.  A slight 
majority of participants came from the after-school enrichment program (54.63%), with the balance 
coming from the summer day programs or recruited to our lab from the community, a roughly even split 
confirming our recruitment strategy was likely to provide the needed socioeconomic variance.  Indeed, 
given the oft-noted relationship between SES and race and ethnicity, a second suggestion of some success 
in our recruitment strategy is shown by the race and ethnicity of our sample: most notably, 37.04% Black 
or African American, 29.63% White, and 14.81% Asian.  Given the frequent mention of multilingualism 
in creativity-related research, it is also noteworthy that nearly a fifth of our sample (19.44%) self-reported 









Descriptive Statistics of Participant Sample 
 Count %  
Program Type   
 Enrichment 59 54.63% 
 Lab 13 12.04% 
 Summer 36 33.33% 
Multilingualism   
 Participant answered “no” 87 80.56% 
 Participant answered “yes” 21 19.44% 
Gender   
 Female 56 51.85% 
 Male 52 48.15% 
Race and Ethnicity   
 Hispanic 2 1.85% 
 American Indian or Alaska Native 2 1.85% 
 Asian 16 14.81% 
 Black or African American 40 37.04% 
 Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 0 0.00% 
 White 32 29.63% 
 Multiple Selected 15 13.89% 
 No Response 1 0.93% 
Handedness   
 Both 4 3.70% 
 Left 6 5.56% 
 Right 98 90.74% 
 
Table 4.2 shows descriptive statistics for the numerical or numerical-transformed items from the 
guardian survey.  The mean household size was about 4 people (M = 4.15) with about 2 (M = 2.10) of 
those people being under the age of 18.  Guardians were given different category options for reporting 
total household income, ranging from “below $25,000” to “above $200,000”, with five other range 
options in between.  These options were all collapsed to their midpoint values (or their stated values for 
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the two extremes) for ease of analysis.  Using these midpoint values for analysis, we found mean 
household income for the 77 respondents that provided this information (M = $122,402.60; SD = 
$68,415.38) to be bimodally distributed: about 42% of the sample reported $150,000 and above, whereas 
about 24% reported $50,000 or below (see Figure 1).   
 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Items on Guardian Survey 
 n M (SD) Range 
People in household 87 4.15 (1.01) 2 – 7 
People under 18 86 2.10 (0.84) 1 – 6 
Household incomea 77 $122,402.60 ($68,415.38) $25,000 – $200,000 
Highest guardian occupation prestige 96 5.88 (1.06) 3.00 – 7.60 
Note. n = number of respondents; M (SD) = mean and standard deviation; aresponses for this measure 
were transformed to the mean of the salary range selected by the guardian. 
 
For occupational prestige and educational attainment, only the highest guardian score on each is 
described since only these were used for analyses.  The average occupational prestige in our sample (M = 
5.88; representing, e.g., a Business Entrepreneur, Computer Network Engineer, or Public Grade School 
Teacher) falls slightly above the middle of the scale used to code prestige.  The range in our sample (3.00 





Figure 4.1. Epanechnikov kernel density plot of mean-transformed household incomes. 
 
Table 4.3 shows the highest guardian educational attainment for the households in our sample.  
The vast majority of the students’ guardians in this sample were well-educated, having attained a 
Bachelor’s degree or more.  For ease of analysis, each of the attainment levels was coded as years of 
education (the coded years for each level is shown in parentheses in Table 4.3).  This coded years of 
education variable had a mean of 16.54 (SD = 3.08; [10 – 20]), suggesting the average highest household 




Observed Frequencies of Educational Attainment Categories and Coded Number of Years for Analysis 
 n % of item respondents  
Highest guardian education (coded years)   
 Some high school (10) 2 1.85% 
 GED certificate (11) 1 0.93% 
 High school diploma (12) 11 10.19% 
 Associate degree (14) 2 1.85% 
 Vocational degree 0 0.00% 
 Some college (13) 17 15.74% 
 Bachelor’s degree (16) 21 19.44% 
 Master’s degree (18) 21 19.44% 
 Doctorate degree (20) 12 11.11% 
 Professional degree (20) 17 15.74% 
 Doctoral and Professional degrees (20) 4 3.70% 
Note. n = number of respondents. 
 
Creating an SES Composite 
Following common practice and established recommendations for analyzing SES (e.g., Cowan et 
al., 2012) we examined three of the above indicators: highest guardian educational attainment, highest 
guardian occupational prestige, and household income.  These three indicators were highly interrelated in 
this sample, with the lowest correlation between any two being r = 0.69 and the highest being r = 0.72.  
Thus, all three were combined into a composite.  To create the composite variable, we first standardized 
these three indicators to have means of zero and standard deviations of one.   
 Seventy-one participants had observed values for all three indicators.  The composite for these 
participants had a mean of 0.45 (SD = 2.54; [-6.04 – 3.83]).  However, in order to maximize statistical 
power for these analyses, we examined the possibility of including an additional 37 participants in our 
sample that had at least one indicator of SES, but not all three.  Rather than combining linearly, this 
composite is an average of whichever indicators were observed (M = -0.09; SD = 0.92; [-2.08 – 1.28]).  
The distributions of both of these composites were similar upon visual inspection.  More importantly, 
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correlations between each of these SES measures and other key study variables demonstrated similar 
relationships; all of the coefficient magnitudes and ordinalities were similar.  Therefore, we used the 
average-based composite moving forward in order to maximize our analytical sample. 
Relationships Among Key Study Variables 
 Table 4.4 provides means, standard deviations, and ranges, and Table 4.5 provides pairwise 
correlation coefficients for key study variables.  To help guide the reader through the correlation 
coefficients, interpretations will move from left to right across columns, and from top to bottom, starting 
with the correlations between the SES composite and other variables.  It is important to note that these 
correlation coefficients were not corrected for multiple comparisons since the object here was to begin to 
describe and explore the data, not answer any of our key research questions.  The only analytical 
decisions we made based upon these correlations were whether or not to create composites.  Here, the 
significance of the coefficients is less important than their magnitudes; the size of the coefficients 
suggests an effect size and can point towards any issues of collinearity – both important considerations 





Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges for Key Study Variables 
 Mean (SD) Range 
SES Composite -0.09 (0.92) -2.08 – 1.28 
Digit Span Backwards 4.76 (1.41) 2 – 8 
Go-No-Go 7.67 (1.47) 4 – 10 
Color-Shape Shiftinga 249.54 (427.18) -2501.74 – 1565.15 
Alphabetical-Categorical Fluency 11.44 (4.52) 3 – 23 
DT Instances – Fluency 10.05 (4.02) 3 – 21 
DT Instances – Originalityb 0.50 (0.23) 0 – 1 
DT Uses – Fluency 6.94 (2.69) 2 – 17 
DT Uses – Originalityb 0.72 (0.21) 0 – 1 
Insight Problems 1.13 (1.15) 0 – 4 
Remote Associates Test 3.48 (2.80) 0 – 12 
World Scramble 9.47 (3.29) 2 – 16 
Note. SD = standard deviation; SES = socioeconomic status; DT = divergent thinking; 
ameasured in milliseconds as the cost associated with shifting attention; boriginality was 
calculated via a percentage method (student’s fluency on that item being the 
denominator). 
 
 As Table 4.5 shows, higher SES was significantly associated with higher performance on the 
Digit Span Backwards task (r = 0.27), but not with either of the other two measures of executive 
functioning, the Go-No-Go (r = 0.07) and Color-Shape Shifting (r = -0.04) tasks.  In contrast, SES was 
significantly related to five of the eight creative cognitive measures.  The highest of these significant 
associations was r = 0.39 with the RAT items and the lowest was r = 0.20 with the DT Instances 






















DT Uses – 
Fluency 
DT Uses – 






SES Composite 1.00            
Digit Span Backwards 0.27* 1.00           
Go-No-Go 0.07 0.07 1.00          
Color-Shape Shiftinga -0.04 0.01 0.11 1.00         
Alphabetical-Categorical Fluency 0.36* 0.28* 0.10 -0.03 1.00        
DT Instances – Fluency 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.34* 1.00       
DT Instances – Originalityb 0.20* 0.13 -0.10 -0.11 -0.04 0.08 1.00      
DT Uses – Fluency 0.23* 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.23* 0.42* 0.15 1.00     
DT Uses – Originalityb -0.02 -0.14 0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.15 -0.14 0.30* 1.00    
Insight Items 0.34* 0.18 0.08 -0.13 0.30* 0.22* 0.15 0.16 0.16 1.00   
Remote Associates Test 0.39* 0.39* -0.07 -0.08 0.42* 0.27* 0.15 0.24* -0.03 0.55* 1.00  
World Scramble 0.11 0.21* 0.04 -0.15 0.27* 0.30* 0.18 0.07 -0.05 0.44* 0.42* 1.00 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; DT = divergent thinking; ameasured in milliseconds as the cost associated with shifting attention; boriginality was calculated via a percentage method 
(student’s fluency on that item being the denominator). 







The measure of working memory – Digit Span Backwards – has already been noted for its 
significant association with SES.  Further, it was not related to either of the other two executive 
functioning tasks (r’s of 0.07 and 0.01).  Greater working memory capacity was significantly associated 
with greater performance on three of the creative cognitive measures: Alphabetical-Categorical Fluency (r 
= 0.28), RAT items (r = 0.39), and Word Scramble items (r = 0.21).  The other two measures of executive 
functioning have already been noted for their lack of any significant associations with SES and the 
measure of working memory; additionally, there were no significant relationships between either Go-No-
Go or Color-Shape Shifting and any of the creative cognitive variables.   
 Alphabetical-Categorical fluency has already been distinguished for its relationship with SES and 
Digit Span Backwards.  Higher associative processing scores were also significantly related to higher 
performance on most of the other creative cognitive measures.   Specifically, there were relationships 
with both DT fluency measures (r = 0.34 and r = 0.23 for Instances and Uses, respectively), as well as 
with Insight problems (r = 0.30), RAT items (r = 0.42), and Word Scramble items (r = 0.27).  The two 
creative cognitive measures with which associative processing was not related were both of the DT 
originality scores. 
The two DT fluency measures were moderately related to one another (r = 0.42), with higher 
performance on one associated with higher performance on the other.  Only one of these was related to 
either of the DT originality scores; higher Uses Fluency scores were significantly related to higher Uses 
Originality scores (r = 0.30).  Instances Fluency was significantly associated with Insight problems (r = 
0.22), RAT items (r = 0.27), and Word Scramble items (r = 0.30), whereas Uses Fluency was only related 
to RAT items (r = 0.24); though, in all of these instances, higher fluency scores were associated with 
higher RAT performance. 
The findings for the DT Originality scores stand in contrast.  They were not significantly related 
to each other, nor to Insight problems, RAT items, or Word Scramble items.  Indeed, the only significant 
association with another creative cognitive measure was that mentioned above between Uses Fluency and 




lowest significant relationship between the SES composite and a creative cognitive measure.  The 
findings noted in this paragraph and the prior paragraph suggest that DT scores and tasks cannot be 
combined into composites in subsequent analyses.  Instead they should remain separate indicators due to 
their relatively distinct patterns of associations with other variables in the study, as well as inconsistent 
intercorrelations. 
Last, the relationships relevant to the insight measures (and associative processing in the case of 
the RAT items) – which have all been mentioned above – can be summarized as follows.  Two of the 
three, Insight problems and RAT items, were significantly associated with SES.  A distinct pair – RAT 
and Scramble items – were significantly related to working memory performance.  All three were related 
to at least half of the creative cognitive measures, and, finally, all three were moderately correlated with 
one another, suggesting that higher performance on one will predict higher performance on the other two 
(though, the relationship between Insight problems and RAT items (r = 0.55) was particularly strong). 
Selecting Covariates 
To determine which covariates would be included in subsequent analyses and which would be 
excluded, pairwise correlations were examined between each of the hypothesized covariates and the key 
study variables using a liberal alpha level of 0.05.  Multilingualism and processing speed were retained 
for subsequent analyses because both multilingualism and processing speed were significantly related in 
the hypothesized (positive) direction with four of the creative cognitive variables, the SES composite, and 
working memory.  Age was also included because of significant associations in the hypothesized 
(positive) direction with Insight problems, RAT items, and Word Scramble items.  Gender was not related 
to any of the key study variables and handedness only had one significant relationship in a non-
hypothesized direction (right-handedness predicted better outcomes on the creative cognitive variables), 
so neither of these were included. 
The Decision to Exclude Program Type and Race and Ethnicity 
The following race and ethnicity categories were not significantly related to any key study 




level of 0.05).  There were, however, several significant relationships in directions hypothesized – given 
the aforementioned intertwined nature of race and ethnicity and SES – between selecting Asian, Black or 
African American, or White and key study variables – particularly SES, though also working memory and 
several of the creative cognitive variables.  Indeed, pairwise correlations between SES and selecting 
Asian, White, or Black or African American were r = 0.27, r = 0.51, and r = -0.60, respectively, 
suggesting our Asian and White students to have higher composite SES scores than their Black or African 
American counterparts. 
Unsurprisingly given the observed race and ethnicity disparities across different program types 
(35 of the 59 students from an enrichment program were Black or African American; 34 of the 49 
students from summer or lab recruitment were White or Asian), there is a similar finding for program 
type.  Specifically, students recruited from a summer day program (r = 0.46) or to our lab (r = 0.27) 
tended to have a higher SES, whereas students recruited from the after-school enrichment programs 
tended to have a lower SES (r = -0.61).  Both summer program and enrichment program participation also 
had several significant positive and negative relationships, respectively, with several of the key cognitive 
variables under investigation.  Table 4.6 illustrates this as well.  For further evidence of the similar results 




Means and Standard Deviations for the Three SES Indicators by Program Type 
 Enrichment Lab Summer 
Highest guardian education attainmenta 14.75 (2.81) 18.92 (1.93) 18.61 (1.64) 
Highest guardian occupation prestige 5.46 (1.10) 6.36 (0.89) 6.38 (0.75) 






Note. n = number of respondents; M (SD) = mean and standard deviation; aresponses for this measure 
were coded to number of years based on the education level selected by the participant; bresponses for 





As one final demonstration of the strongly intertwined nature of SES, program type, and race and 
ethnicity in this sample, SES was regressed on binary indicators for the three program types and the race 
and ethnicity categories just mentioned.  These six indicators predicted over 46% of the variance in SES 
(adj. R2 = 0.46).  Anecdotally, these intercorrelational findings were expected.  The after-school 
enrichment programs were designed to provide talent development experiences to urban students in 
under-resourced communities who might otherwise not be able to afford such experiences.  Students 
attending summer day sites in affluent suburban areas generally paid a non-trivial out-of-pocket expense 
in order to attend.  Indeed, as described in the Participants section above, we specifically targeted our 
recruitment in these different contexts in order to maximize our chance of having adequate variability of 
SES to detect any possible relationships with our cognitive variables of interest.  This provides evidence 
that our recruitment strategy was successful. 
So, though highly intertwined, both variables were removed from further consideration for two 
reasons.  First, their inclusion would deter from answering the central questions concerning SES 
relationships.  Both race and ethnicity and program type covary to such a high degree with SES and other 
cognitive variables that the variance shared between SES and the cognitive variables may effectively be 
controlled out of the models if the variance shared by SES, program type, and race and ethnicity were 
accounted for statistically.  Second, there are not any strong theoretical precedents for doing so in relation 
to the cognitive variables being examined, particularly in the case of race and ethnicity. 
Socioeconomic Contrasts Across Key Study Variables 
Before moving to the relative complexity of the subsequent regression analyses, it is worth 
simply laying bear first any differences on key study variables across two SES groups: a median split of 
lower and higher SES students in this sample.  Table 4.7 displays the results of these t-tests.  Using a 






Results of t-Tests Contrasting Lower and Higher SES Students Over a Median Split 
 Lower SES M (SD) Higher SES M (SD) t Value (p-value) 
Symbol-Digit Modalities 42.57 (11.72) 45.69 (11.04) 1.42 (0.159) 
Digit Span Backwards 4.48 (1.41) 5.04 (1.36) 2.08 (0.040) 
Go-No-Go 7.54 (1.49) 7.80 (1.44) 0.93 (0.353) 
Color-Shape Shifting 292.66 (369.02) 204.66 (480.08) -1.03 (0.306) 
Alphabetical-Categorical Fluency 10.28 (4.07) 12.61 (4.68) 2.76 (0.009) 
DT Instances – Fluency 9.81 (3.78) 10.28 (4.28) 0.60 (0.552) 
DT Instances – Originality 0.47 (0.24) 0.53 (0.20) 1.41 (0.162) 
DT Uses – Fluency 6.48 (2.51) 7.39 (2.81) 1.77 (0.080) 
DT Uses – Originality 0.70 (0.22) 0.73 (0.21) 0.63 (0.532) 
Insight Problems 0.94 (1.14) 1.31 (1.15) 1.68 (0.095) 
Remote Associates Test 2.81 (2.62) 4.15 (2.84) 2.54 (0.013) 
World Scramble 9.22 (2.87) 9.72 (3.68) 0.79 (0.433) 
Note. M (SD) = mean and standard deviation. 
* p < 0.004 (family-wise error rate based on 12 statistical tests) 
 
Does Student SES Predict the Creative Cognitive Skills?   
 In total, eight two-step regression models (with p values corrected for family-wise error rates) 
were estimated between the SES composite and each of the eight creative cognitive variables: 
Alphabetical-Categorical Fluency, Instances Fluency, Instances Originality, Uses Fluency, Uses 
Originality, Insight problems, RAT items, and Word Scramble items. 
 Table 4.8 shows the results of the model between SES and Alphabetical-Categorical Fluency.  
The initial model with only the covariates entered was not significant (adj. R2 = 0.06; p-value = 0.022).  
Socioeconomic status was entered in the second step, yielding a significant overall model (adj. R2 = 0.14; 
p-value = 0.001), as well as a significant increase in the total variance explained by the model (Δ adj. R2 = 
0.08; p-value = 0.002).  Specifically, higher SES was associated with higher scores on the associative 





Two-Step Regression Results Relating SES to Associative Processing 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting AP) Model 2 (Add SES) 
  Coefficient β (p-value) Coefficient β (p-value) 
 Intercept 7.49  9.31  
 SES    0.30* (0.002) 
Covariates      
 Multilingualism  0.24 (0.013)  0.19 (0.044) 
 Processing speed  0.09 (0.390)  0.05 (0.650) 
 Age  0.05 (0.651)  0.03 (0.789) 
Adj. R2   0.06 (0.022)  0.14* (0.001) 
Δ Adj. R2     0.08* (0.002) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; AP = Associative Processing. 
* p < .005 (family-wise error rate based on 10 statistical tests) 
 
The tables displaying the results of the models between SES and each of the four DT measures 
are displayed in full in Appendix C (Tables C.1 through C.4).  None of the statistics estimated here were 
significant for any of the models.  Specifically, neither multilingualism, nor age, nor processing speed 
explained any variance in the DT indicators.  Furthermore, none of the SES coefficients were significant, 
none of the models including SES were significant, and none of the increases in adjusted R2 were 
significant when SES was entered into the models. 
 Table 4.9 presents the model regressing Insight Problem scores on SES.  The covariate-only 
model was significant overall (adj. R2 = 0.18; p-value < 0.001), though none of the individual covariates 
were significant predictors.  The model in which SES was entered was also significant (adj. R2 = 0.23; p-






Two-Step Regression Results Relating SES to Insight Problems 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting Insight) Model 2 (Add SES) 
  Coefficient β (p-value) Coefficient β (p-value) 
 Intercept -2.12  -1.77  
 SES    0.23 (0.011) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.21 (0.022)  0.17 (0.060) 
 Processing speed  0.20 (0.048)  0.16 (0.095) 
 Age  0.23 (0.020)  0.21 (0.026) 
Adj. R2  0.18* (<0.001)  0.23* (<0.001) 
Δ Adj. R2    0.05 (0.011) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; Insight = Insight Problems. 
* p < .005 (family-wise error rate based on 10 statistical tests) 
 
Table 4.10 presents the model regressing RAT item scores on SES.  The initial model 
significantly explained about 19% of the variance in RAT scores (adj. R2 = 0.19; p-value < 0.001), with 
being self-identified as multilingual associated with better scores (β = 0.27, p-value = 0.004).  When SES 
was entered in the second step, the overall model was significant (adj. R2 = 0.25; p-value < 0.001), the 
change in variance explained was significant (Δ adj. R2 = 0.06; p-value = 0.002), and SES was the lone 
significant predictor of RAT scores (β = 0.28, p-value = 0.002), suggesting that higher SES was 






Two-Step Regression Results Relating SES to RAT Items 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting RAT) Model 2 (Add SES) 
  Coefficient β (p-value) Coefficient β (p-value) 
 Intercept -2.49  -1.44  
 SES    0.28* (0.002) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.27* (0.004)  0.22 (0.015) 
 Processing speed  0.24 (0.018)  0.19 (0.043) 
 Age  0.13 (0.192)  0.11 (0.246) 
Adj. R2  0.19* (<0.001)  0.25* (<0.001) 
Δ Adj. R2    0.06* (0.002) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; RAT = Remote Associates Test items. 
* p < .005 (family-wise error rate based on 10 statistical tests) 
 
 The final model examining SES and creative cognitive skills focused on the Word Scramble 
items (Table 4.11).  The initial covariate model was significant overall (adj. R2 = 0.16; p-value < 0.001), 
but not of the coefficients were significant individually.  In the second step, the overall model remained 






Two-Step Regression Results Relating SES to Word Scramble Scores 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting WS) Model 2 (Add SES) 
  Coefficient β (p-value) Coefficient β (p-value) 
 Intercept 1.50  1.46  
 SES    -0.01 (0.913) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.15 (0.098)  0.15 (0.101) 
 Processing speed  0.28 (0.007)  0.28 (0.007) 
 Age  0.15 (0.131)  0.15 (0.132) 
Adj. R2  0.16* (<0.001)  0.15* (<0.001) 
Δ Adj. R2    -0.01 (0.913) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; WS = Word Scramble items. 
* p < .005 (family-wise error rate based on 10 statistical tests) 
 
How are Specific Executive Functioning Skills Related to Each of the Creative Cognitive Skills?   
 Table 4.12 displays the results of the models regressing associative processing on the three 
executive skills.  None of the statistics here estimated were significant at either step.  Specifically, neither 





Two-Step Regression Results Relating Executive Skills to Associative Processing 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting AP) Model 2 (Add ES) 
  Coefficient β (p-value) Coefficient β (p-value) 
 Intercept 7.49  4.27  
 Working Memory    0.25 (0.021) 
 Inhibitory Control    0.09 (0.332) 
 Shifting    -0.06 (0.543) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.24 (0.013)  0.23 (0.024) 
 Processing speed  0.09 (0.390)  0.01 (0.966) 
 Age  0.05 (0.651)  0.02 (0.886) 
Adj. R2  0.06 (0.022)  0.11 (0.011) 
Δ Adj. R2    0.05 (0.087) 
Note. ES = executive skills; AP = associative processing. 
* p < .004 (family-wise error rate based on 12 statistical tests) 
 
 Again, the models for DT are in Appendix C (Tables C.5 through C.8).  None of the statistics 
estimated here were significant for any of the models.  Specifically, neither multilingualism, nor age, nor 
processing speed explained any variance in the DT indicators.  Furthermore, none of the executive skills 
coefficients were significant, none of the models including these skills were significant, and none of the 
increases in adjusted R2 were significant when they entered into the models. 
 Table 4.13 shows the results of the model regressing Insight Problem performance on executive 
skills.  The initial covariate model was significant overall (adj. R2 = 0.18; p-value < 0.001), but not of the 
coefficients were significant individually.  In the second step, the overall model remained significant (adj. 







Two-Step Regression Results Relating Executive Skills to Insight Problem Performance 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting Insight) Model 2 (Add ES) 
  Coefficient β (p-value) Coefficient β (p-value) 
 Intercept -2.12  -2.35  
 Working Memory    0.09 (0.378) 
 Inhibitory Control    0.10 (0.277) 
 Shifting    -0.13 (0.152) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.21 (0.022)  0.21 (0.028) 
 Processing speed  0.20 (0.048)  0.19 (0.095) 
 Age  0.23 (0.020)  0.17 (0.103) 
Adj. R2  0.18* (<0.001)  0.19* (<0.001) 
Δ Adj. R2    0.01 (0.301) 
Note. ES = executive skills; Insight = Insight Problem items. 
* p < .004 (family-wise error rate based on 12 statistical tests) 
 
Table 4.14 shows the results of the model regressing RAT problem performance on executive 
skills.  The initial model significantly explained about 19% of the variance in RAT scores (adj. R2 = 0.19; 
p-value < 0.001), with being self-identified as multilingual associated with better scores (β = 0.27, p-value 
= 0.004).  When executive skills were entered in the second step, the overall model was significant (adj. 
R2 = 0.25; p-value < 0.001); however, the change in variance explained was not significant, nor were the 







Two-Step Regression Results Relating Executive Skills to RAT Problem Performance 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting 
RAT) 
Model 2 (Add ES) 
  Coefficient β (p-value) Coefficient β (p-value) 
 Intercept -2.49  -4.32  
 Working Memory    0.25 (0.011) 
 Inhibitory Control    -0.08 (0.359) 
 Shifting    -0.08 (0.384) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.27* (0.004)  0.22 (0.021) 
 Processing speed  0.24 (0.018)  0.12 (0.268) 
 Age  0.13 (0.192)  0.20 (0.039) 
Adj. R2  0.19* (<0.001)  0.25* (<0.001) 
Δ Adj. R2    0.06 (0.049) 
Note. ES = executive skills; RAT = Remote Associates Test items. 
* p < .004 (family-wise error rate based on 12 statistical tests) 
  
Finally, Table 4.15 displays the results of the two-step model for executive skills and Word 
Scramble performance.  The initial covariate model was significant overall (adj. R2 = 0.16; p-value < 
0.001), but not of the coefficients were significant individually.  In the second step, the overall model 
remained significant (adj. R2 = 0.18; p-value < 0.001), though neither the covariates nor the executive 






Two-Step Regression Results Relating Executive Skills to Word Scramble Performance 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting WS) Model 2 (Add ES) 
  Coefficient β (p-value) Coefficient β (p-value) 
 Intercept 1.50  -0.15  
 Working Memory    0.10 (0.320) 
 Inhibitory Control    0.03 (0.761) 
 Shifting    -0.14 (0.141) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.15 (0.098)  0.12 (0.211) 
 Processing speed  0.28 (0.007)  0.24 (0.035) 
 Age  0.15 (0.131)  0.18 (0.084) 
Adj. R2  0.16* (<0.001)  0.18* (<0.001) 
Δ Adj. R2    0.02 (0.381) 
Note. ES = executive skills; WS = Word Scramble items. 
* p < .004 (family-wise error rate based on 12 statistical tests) 
 
Are SES-Creative Cognitive Relations Mediated by or in Interaction With Executive Skills?   
To review, this final research question was concerned with two viewpoints.  The first was the 
degree to which any relationships found between SES and creative cognitive skills (addressed by the first 
research question) might be explained by any of the executive skills.  The preceding analyses found that 
SES significantly predicted associative processing and RAT performance.  The next step was to 
determine if any of the executive skills mediate part of these two SES-creative cognitive skills 
relationships by examining two separate stepwise models aimed at uncovering evidence of mediation 
(with p values corrected for family-wise error rates).   
Table 4.16 shows the results of the mediational model predicting associative processing.  Model 1 
(adj. R2 = 0.14; p-value = 0.001) restates the significant prediction of associative processing by SES (β = 
0.30, p-value = 0.002).  When executive skills were added to the model, the overall model was still 




nor executive skills were significant predictors in the model, and the change in variance explained was 
not a significant improvement over the more parsimonious model. 
 
Table 4.16 
Two-Step Regression Examining Mediation of SES-Associative Processing by Executive Skills 
  Model 1 (No ES) Model 2 (Add ES) 
  Coefficient β (p-value) Coefficient β (p-value) 
 Intercept 9.31  6.37  
 SES  0.30* (0.002)  0.25 (0.014) 
Possible Mediators     
 Working Memory    0.19 (0.070) 
 Inhibitory Control    0.07 (0.432) 
 Shifting    -0.05 (0.625) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.19 (0.044)  0.20 (0.051) 
 Processing speed  0.05 (0.650)  -0.02 (0.892) 
 Age  0.03 (0.789)  0.01 (0.937) 
Adj. R2  0.14* (0.001)  0.15* (0.002) 
Δ Adj. R2    0.01 (0.254) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; ES = executive skills. 
* p < .004 (family-wise error rate based on 14 statistical tests) 
 
Table 4.17 shows the results of the mediational model predicting RAT performance.  Model 1 
(adj. R2 = 0.25; p-value < 0.001) restates the significant prediction of RAT scores by SES (β = 0.28, p-
value = 0.002).  When executive skills were added to the model, the overall model was still significant in 
predicting RAT scores (adj. R2 = 0.30; p-value < 0.001).  However, neither SES nor executive skills were 
significant predictors in the model, and the change in variance explained was not a significant 







Two-Step Regression Examining Mediation of SES-RAT Performance by Executive Skills 
  Model 1 (No ES) Model 2 (Add ES) 
  Coefficient β (p-value) Coefficient β (p-value) 
 Intercept -1.44  -2.97  
 SES  0.28* (0.002)  0.26 (0.006) 
Possible Mediators     
 Working Memory    0.19 (0.043) 
 Inhibitory Control    -0.10 (0.237) 
 Shifting    -0.07 (0.455) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.22 (0.015)  0.18 (0.048) 
 Processing speed  0.19 (0.043)  0.10 (0.346) 
 Age  0.11 (0.246)  0.20 (0.039) 
Adj. R2  0.25* (<0.001)  0.30* (<0.001) 
Δ Adj. R2    0.05 (0.115) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; ES = executive skills; RAT = Remote Associates Test items. 
* p < .004 (family-wise error rate based on 14 statistical tests) 
 
 The second perspective on this final question concerned profiles of cognitive skills, which might 
be illuminated by interactions between participant SES background and their executive skills.  Table 4.18 
displays the results of the first of these models (all with p values corrected for family-wise error rates) 
with associative processing regressed on the addition of interaction terms (Model 2).  The first model with 
first-order SES and executive skills estimations predicted significant variance in associative processing 
scores (adj. R2 = 0.15; p-value = 0.002); however, no individual coefficients were significant predictors.  
When the interaction terms were entered in the second model, none of the statistics here examined were 





Two-Step Regression Examining SES-Executive Skills Interactions Predicting Associative Processing 
  Model 1 (No Interactions) Model 2 (Add Interactions) 
  Coefficient β (p-value) Coefficient β (p-value) 
 Intercept 6.37  7.73  
 SES  0.25 (0.014)  -0.09 (0.894) 
 Working Memory  0.19 (0.070)  0.19 (0.075) 
 Inhibitory Control  0.07 (0.432)  0.08 (0.427) 
 Shifting  -0.05 (0.625)  -0.03 (0.760) 
 SES x Working Memory    0.29 (0.453) 
 SES x Inhibitory Control    -0.04 (0.938) 
 SES x Shifting    0.16 (0.230) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.20 (0.051)  0.19 (0.062) 
 Processing speed  -0.02 (0.892)  -0.01 (0.920) 
 Age  0.01 (0.937)  -0.03 (0.776) 
Adj. R2  0.15* (0.002)  0.14 (0.007) 
Δ Adj. R2    -0.01 (0.582) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status. 
* p < .003 (family-wise error rate based on 20 statistical tests) 
 
 Similar to the trends observed when addressing the above research questions, none of the models 
regressing any of the divergent thinking variables on first order, interaction, or covariate variables were 
significant.  The full results of these analyses are available in Appendix C (Tables C.9 through C.12). 
 Table 4.19 displays the results of the models predicting Insight Problem performance.  The first 
model with first-order SES and executive skills estimations predicted significant variance in Insight 
Problem scores (adj. R2 = 0.21; p-value < 0.001); however, no individual coefficients were significant 
predictors.  When the interaction terms were entered in the second model, the overall model still 




coefficients were significant predictors and the change in variance explained was not a significant 
improvement over the more parsimonious model.  
 
Table 4.19 
Two-Step Regression Examining SES-Executive Skills Interactions Predicting Insight Problem 
Performance 
  Model 1 (No Interactions) Model 2 (Add Interactions) 
  Coefficient β (p-value) Coefficient β (p-value) 
 Intercept -1.97  -1.76  
 SES  0.18 (0.065)  -0.31 (0.651) 
 Working Memory  0.05 (0.625)  0.07 (0.516) 
 Inhibitory Control  0.09 (0.346)  0.08 (0.356) 
 Shifting  -0.13 (0.177)  -0.13 (0.184) 
 SES x Working Memory    0.51 (0.171) 
 SES x Inhibitory Control    -0.03 (0.961) 
 SES x Shifting    0.04 (0.771) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.19 (0.051)  0.17 (0.094) 
 Processing speed  0.17 (0.120)  0.18 (0.113) 
 Age  0.16 (0.109)  0.13 (0.217) 
Adj. R2  0.21* (<0.001)  0.20* (0.001) 
Δ Adj. R2    -0.01 (0.576) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status. 
* p < .003 (family-wise error rate based on 20 statistical tests) 
 
 Table 4.20 displays the results of the models predicting RAT performance.  The first model with 
first-order SES and executive skills estimations predicted significant variance in RAT scores (adj. R2 = 
0.30; p-value < 0.001); however, no individual coefficients were significant predictors.  When the 
interaction terms were entered in the second model, the overall model still significantly predicted variance 




predictors and the change in variance explained was not a significant improvement over the more 
parsimonious model.  
 
Table 4.20 
Two-Step Regression Examining SES-Executive Skills Interactions Predicting RAT Performance 
  Model 1 (No Interactions) Model 2 (Add Interactions) 
  Coefficient β (p-value) Coefficient β (p-value) 
 Intercept -2.97  -3.00  
 SES  0.26 (0.006)  -0.43 (0.498) 
 Working Memory  0.19 (0.043)  0.22 (0.022) 
 Inhibitory Control  -0.10 (0.237)  -0.10 (0.227) 
 Shifting  -0.07 (0.455)  -0.09 (0.330) 
 SES x Working Memory    0.63 (0.070) 
 SES x Inhibitory Control    0.16 (0.748) 
 SES x Shifting    -0.11 (0.340) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.18 (0.048)  0.15 (0.109) 
 Processing speed  0.10 (0.346)  0.10 (0.317) 
 Age  0.20 (0.039)  0.18 (0.064) 
Adj. R2  0.30* (<0.001)  0.31* (<0.001) 
Δ Adj. R2    0.01 (0.224) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; RAT = Remote Associates Test items. 
* p < .003 (family-wise error rate based on 20 statistical tests) 
 
 Finally, Table 4.21 displays the results of the models predicting Word Scramble performance.  
Similar to the findings for DT, none of the key statistics here interpreted were significant, suggesting no 






Two-Step Regression Examining SES-Executive Skills Interactions Predicting Scramble Performance 
  Model 1 (No Interactions) Model 2 (Add Interactions) 
  Coefficient β (p-value) Coefficient β (p-value) 
 Intercept -0.12  -0.78  
 SES  0.00 (0.964)  -0.10 (0.890) 
 Working Memory  0.10 (0.338)  0.12 (0.255) 
 Inhibitory Control  0.03 (0.766)  0.02 (0.796) 
 Shifting  -0.14 (0.144)  -0.16 (0.091) 
 SES x Working Memory    0.22 (0.564) 
 SES x Inhibitory Control    0.01 (0.978) 
 SES x Shifting    -0.19 (0.160) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.12 (0.221)  0.10 (0.342) 
 Processing speed  0.24 (0.037)  0.24 (0.038) 
 Age  0.18 (0.086)  0.19 (0.072) 
Adj. R2  0.17 (0.001)  0.17 (0.003) 
Δ Adj. R2    0.00 (0.491) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status. 







Discussion and Conclusions 
Recognizing a contemporary emphasis on creativity in practice and research, we sought to 
analyze it in a way that illuminates how it might differ according to student socioeconomic circumstances.  
Rather than arriving at a clear, simple answer, we expected this analysis to be complex, involving 
multiple cognitive skills underlying creative behaviors to exhibit different profiles across the 
socioeconomic spectrum.  We expected to see relationships – positive or negative – between SES, 
executive skills, and creative cognitive skills. 
 Our results show that an educational, non-deficit, profile perspective of the way these cognitive 
skills relate to student SES is a useful one.  Indeed, we did not see any simple evidence that, for example, 
students from higher SES backgrounds are more creative; instead, what we found were different cognitive 
landscapes for students from different backgrounds.  Regardless of socioeconomic status, students 
performed similarly on many of the cognitive skills, including executive shifting, inhibitory control, and 
divergent thinking, with mixed results for measures of insight.  All of these important cognitive skills 
thought to contribute in some way to creative behaviors are therefore available in the cognitive toolkits of 
students from all socioeconomic circumstances.  Among the skills we examined, students from families 
with more prestigious occupations, higher household incomes, and higher education attainment did 
exhibit some strengths upon which practitioners might capitalize: associative processing, as well as 
insight, again, with mixed findings, and possibly working memory.  In sum, SES might not be conceived 
of as the blanket, deficit predictor of creative cognitive and executive skills as it has been reported for 
other important educational skills; like past social neurocognitive findings, SES is not globally related to 
cognition, but rather seems to differentially (un)related to different creative cognitive skills. 
Students from a Variety of Socioeconomic Environments Access Certain Cognitive Skills Similarly 
While other have found associations between SES and some of the cognitive skills explored here, 
there are possible reasons why those associations might be products of specific research circumstances 
and not characteristic of a student’s SES designation writ large.  In the case of executive shifting, our 




found an advantage for adults of lower SES in experimentally-induced uncertain conditions.  We neither 
had an adult sample nor had experimentally-induced uncertain conditions.  While that study provided 
enough justification to explore this relationship in a younger population, this could explain why we did 
not see an advantage on this task for our lower SES students (though, it is worth repeating that we also 
did not find any disadvantage).  Indeed, early in development, our young students might be well-equipped 
in this regard. 
That we found no associations between SES and either inhibitory control or shifting should be 
emphasized in support of our non-deficit, neurocognitive profile framework, standing in contrast to oft-
published statistically significant findings.  We have reviewed the evidence for the importance of 
executive functions in childhood development and educational success.  That SES might not be as 
strongly related to some of these (or as many of these) executive functions as we thought is an important 
contribution to our understanding of SES disparities in education.  However, these findings should be 
viewed cautiously until replicated, particularly given the contradictory findings in other studies.  One 
possible reason for this disparity might be in the composition of our sample:  though in different ways, all 
of the participants were somehow identified for talent development potential.  It is worth examining 
further whether or not possessing the sorts of skills – cognitive or otherwise – that predispose a student 
for talent identification acts as a sort of indicator of cognitive adaptation, regardless of socioeconomic 
circumstances. 
Our finding that a student’s socioeconomic context does not predict her divergent thinking 
abilities stands in contrast to the research reviewed above showing connections between the executive 
skills we examined and both SES and divergent thinking, as well as prior findings that SES may be 
related to DT (Dai et al., 2012).  This could be due to the essence of socioeconomic differences and their 
relation to academic outcomes.  Whereas culture and household background may play a larger role in the 
sort of academic language skills requisite for success on, for example, verbal measures of associative 
processing, the role for divergent thinking may be minimal – indeed, even an advantage.  Regardless of 




content of those responses differed substantially; they could generate responses that made sense within 
the socioeconomic contexts to which they have adapted.  Perhaps precisely because of their divergent 
socioeconomic backgrounds we saw similar levels of originality across the SES spectrum.  In other 
words, if the SES differences in this sample were associated with different experiences in recognizing 
instances of a certain shape or uses for a brick, we should expect to see responses considered original 
from students of different types of households, with all having a similar opportunity to demonstrate 
fluency.  Original, creative ideas are likely to come from students who have different experiences as they 
develop – ideas that can benefit their education and society. 
There are clear implications for a socioeconomically-unbiased creative cognitive measure.  
Insofar as generating divergent solutions to problems is important in any educational domain, assessing 
divergent thinking (and its development) is an important responsibility in education.  Having measures 
capable of assessing this development apart from a student’s socioeconomic background would be an 
improvement over many other academic measures that illuminate differences.  Further, educators might 
capitalize upon divergent thinking skills as a resource readily available to students from diverse 
households.  Given Kim’s (2008) meta-analytical findings of both a moderate correlation between 
divergent thinking and creative achievement, as well as a meaningful dissociation between creative 
cognitive abilities and conventional academic skills and intelligence, assessing divergent thinking may be 
an important tool for those educating students across the talent development spectrum to have a fuller 
portrait of each learner’s abilities, as well as any needs for specific interventions (Delis et al., 2007).    
If the identification and development of exceptional divergent thinking is an important 
component of any talent development program – focused on creativity or otherwise, an SES-unbiased 
measure is especially important for ensuring equitable access and outcomes.  Kaufman, Plucker, and 
Russell (2012) noted that divergent thinking measures are the most widely used indicators of creative 
potential and are also often used for talent development identification purposes.  Many conventional, 
standardized assessments for talent development opportunities, such as those of intelligence (e.g., those 




affluent students who have greater access to educational opportunities (e.g., Jencks & Phillips, 1998; 
Steele, 1997).  So, perhaps the use of certain creative cognitive measures, like those assessing divergent 
thinking, are less curriculum-, culturally-, or socially-dependent than others, and thus may serve to more 
equitably admit students from historically underrepresented groups to talent development programs 
seeking to foster creativity.  It is well established that lower-SES and minority students are historically 
underrepresented in talent development programs, and many researchers have called for greater inclusion 
(e.g., Olszewski-Kubilius & Clarenbach, 2012; Plucker, Burroughs, & Song, 2010).  These findings 
suggest a path towards greater inclusion.  To expand upon these findings, future research could also 
incorporate students not participating in a talent development opportunity to see if the present similarities 
in divergent thinking performance are replicated and significantly different from students not 
participating.  If born out, this would further justify an imperative for using divergent thinking measures 
to equitably identify and develop creative talent.   
Importantly, though much of the prior social cognitive neuroscience work has painted a deficit 
picture of the cognitive skills of lower SES students, the shifting, inhibitory control, and divergent 
thinking – and possibly other insight-related – findings here stand in contrast.  If replicated, these results 
suggest that educational equity regarding SES is not as simple as “correcting the deficits of lower SES 
students in order to bring them up to the levels of their more advantaged peers;” there may be some skills 
– such as divergent thinking – on which students across the SES spectrum can equally capitalize upon 
when learning and developing.  Indeed, if the results of Mittal and colleagues (2015) can be extended to 
school-aged children, in certain contexts, lower SES students might actually have advantages that higher 
SES students would need to address to create cognitive parity.  This type of work which helps to 
illuminate the level of learner profiling we might eventually attain in the realms of research and practice 
may ultimately lead to more nuanced guidance for practice and interventions, pinpointed to capitalize on 






Creative Cognitive Strengths for Students from Higher Socioeconomic Backgrounds 
To consider the significant positive associations between SES and both associative processing 
and insight (particularly as evidenced by RAT performance), we have to consider non-executive lines of 
explanation, as there was little evidence of executive mediation.  It is important to note that the measures 
of associative processing and insight were all verbal as opposed to spatial.  While the divergent thinking 
tasks – on which there were no differences across the SES spectrum – required the student to read a 
single-sentence prompt and generate verbal answers, the other creative cognitive tasks arguably required 
more extensive knowledge of vocabulary and reading comprehension.  For example, the associative 
processing task required knowledge of a wide array of vocabulary in the domains of animals or fruits and 
vegetables.  Farah and colleagues (2006) provide just one recent neurocognitive example in a long lineage 
of sociological language-equity research of finding a relationship between SES and language processing, 
including a measure of vocabulary in particular.  Future research should examine the extent to which SES 
plays a role in performance on spatial, or other nonverbal, measures of insight and associative processing, 
as well as SES differences on particular types of insight measures, given the null findings for our word 
problems and scrambles. 
One of the implications of this finding is that we can add verbal associative processing – and 
possibly verbal insight – to the long list of education-related outcomes that have displayed similar 
advantages for higher SES students.  This is a notable addition to our research base given the findings 
from our review of prior research in this area marked by little to no relationships with SES.  Given that 
creativity is being emphasized more in contemporary education curricula and reforms, and given that 
these creative cognitive skills may predict creative behaviors and accomplishments, it is important to 
consider additional policy and practice interventions in order to more equitably distribute opportunities 
for their development.   
Golnabi (2016) provides one analysis of how the cognitive processes involved in insight problem 
solving (such as those thought to substantially underlie RAT performance) are similar to – and perhaps 




substantially true, the present findings could have ramifications for SES differences when solving such 
math problems – as well as implications for how to intervene.  In a similar vein, Lv (2015) provides an 
analysis of insight problem solving (albeit not RAT problem solving) broken into two stages – an initial 
phase for solution searching, followed by a phase in which the problem is reconceived to arrive at a 
solution.  Each phase in that study was found to correspond distinctly with working memory or inhibition, 
respectively.  That sort of analysis and future work can provide the foundation for interventions aimed at 
improving students’ verbal insight problem solving abilities.   
Unlike next research steps with divergent thinking, where extensive work over decades has 
examined the psychometric properties of various measures, there is still much more work to be done with 
associative processing and insight problem solving in this domain.  The research community should 
establish a few reliable, valid measures so that findings such as these and others can be replicated or 
qualified across different samples and contexts.  Given the empirical history of RAT research, this 
measure may be a particularly suitable candidate for insight problem solving.  Further, these findings 
suggest the importance of measuring and controlling for SES when examining verbal associative 
processing or RAT performance.  Knowing about inequities that can be intervened upon allows for any 
number of actions in education, including broadly measuring these creative cognitive skills in students or 
adding such skills as part of accountability systems to ensure that they are being developed equitably.   
Limited Overall Support for Executive Creative Cognition 
Our correlations results suggested that working memory – more so than inhibitory control or 
shifting – was the important executive skill to consider for both SES and creative cognitive skills – not 
executive functioning writ large.  That is, perhaps SES has a more granular, nuanced relationship with 
specific executive functioning skills, or even with specific skills in different developmental and 
environmental contexts.  To reiterate, there was no evidence of roles for either shifting or inhibition in 
any of the creative cognitive skills, similar to the findings of Lee and Therriault (2013), who noted only a 
working memory underpinning.  Further, we found no evidence of executive mediation between SES and 




moderate relationship between SES and working memory in primary-aged students, in educational 
settings throughout the United States.  Indeed, recent findings by Finn and colleagues (2017) in 
adolescents show the intertwined nature of working memory performance, the neural underpinnings of 
working memory, family income, and student achievement in mathematics.   
This is a substantial departure from prior findings which have implicated working memory, 
inhibition, and shifting in certain creative cognitive skills.  One reason for this departure may pertain to 
the developmental level of our sample.  Prior findings are largely confined to college-aged samples (e.g., 
Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011), and we know that executive, 
prefrontal-dependent skills tend to follow a protracted developmental pathway.  There are also differences 
in the tasks used to measure these constructs across studies (e.g., Mittenecker Pointing Test; Rominger et 
al., 2018, p. 260) – partly as a function of developmental differences: task difficulty needed to be taken 
into account in the present study given the ages of the participants.  Also, when studying the neural 
underpinnings of working memory across development, Bathelt, Gathercole, Johnson, and Astle (2018) 
found that, though the cognitive representation of working memory did not change during childhood 
development, the neural underpinnings did; a diffuse network in early childhood became increasingly 
narrow and specialized in later childhood.  It is possible that the way in which this working memory 
network interacts with performance on creative cognitive tasks may thus change throughout childhood 
and into adulthood, allowing for executive explanations of creative performance in older samples.  This 
underscores the importance of studying these relationships across childhood development.   
One possibility for the null findings between working memory and our measures of insight is that 
the particular demands of our insight tasks may not have favored working memory support.  In a 
commentary and response to prior findings, DeCaro, Van Stockum Jr., and Wieth (2017) proposed that 
working memory may alternately benefit or detract from performance on insight problems depending 
upon the type of insight problem and the particular stage of the problem-solving process.  In some of their 
original experiments (DeCaro, Van Stockum Jr., & Wieth, 2016), they similarly suggested that working 




might effectively nullify any correlational findings when looking at the process as a whole.  A more 
fruitful way of examining this might therefore be to analyze the insight process in small components, 
alongside working memory.   
Therefore, one example of how this area of research might progress and the aim to which it might 
progress is the Executive Abilities: Measures and Instruments for Neurobehavioral Evaluation and 
Research (EXAMINER) project, as explained by Kramer and colleagues (2014).  They noted both 
inconsistencies in how executive functioning was being operationalized and measured, as well as the 
somewhat vague broadness of the construct, necessitating more granularity for further research and 
clinical work.  While the field of creativity research is far from that of executive functioning in hoping to 
undertake a project like this in the short-term, this sort of work serves as a blueprint and long-term goal 
for what is currently needed: the compilation of various creative cognitive skills into a battery that is 
exhaustive in measuring the underpinnings of creative behavior and also conceptually instructive in 
explaining the cognitive landscape of creativity.  Once such a conceptualization and battery of creative 
cognitive measures is agreed upon in the field, the next step would be to examine carefully the 
associations between an executive functioning battery such as the EXAMINER and the resulting creative 
cognitive battery in order to shed more light upon the relations between these two constructs.   
In the short-term, more work like that done by Nusbaum and Silvia (2011) and in the present 
study is needed to catalogue what we know individually about these collections of executive and creative 
cognitive skills (variously operationalized, across various developmental contexts), the accumulation of 
which will begin to provide a clearer picture of any overlap in these executive and creative cognitive 
landscapes.  For example, Kleibeuker, De Dreu, and Crone (2016) provided an overview of the 
development of distinct creative cognitive skills during adolescence and beyond; similar work is needed 
beginning earlier in childhood.  Further, researchers publishing work in this area need to find ways to 
share both null and significant findings for specific, disaggregated executive functioning and creative 




fuller picture of the research results may help illuminate this puzzle.  Meta-analyses may prove 
particularly useful for meeting this need.   
As mentioned above, Lv (2015) provides one useful illustration of the granularity to which we 
might strive in mapping this cognitive area.  Given the present correlational findings between working 
memory and creative cognitive skills, there is a foundation for similar microscopic work as an extension 
of these results.  For example, Baddeley (2012) described a widely-accepted four-component model of 
working memory, including central executive, visuo-spatial sketch-pad, phonological loop, and episodic 
buffer components.  Just as we analyzed components of executive functioning, so too might future studies 
examine the components of working memory in relation to creative cognitive skills and phases of their 
processes.  Indeed, Swanson and Fung (2016) provide an example of doing something similar with 
working memory and solving math word problems with implications for exploring ways to improve 
mathematical abilities at a newly granular level.   
While the implications of these findings for policy and practice are somewhat tenuous, they add 
controversy to the research examining the neurocognitive underpinnings of creativity.  For example, 
Nusbaum and Silvia (2011) made the argument that executive functioning is central to divergent thinking.  
Here, in a younger, talent development sample, we failed to replicate that finding, suggesting the need for 
future research to reconcile these divergent findings.  At the very least, an executive explanation of 
divergent thinking skills needs to be examined for its reliability; however, it may be time to either 
broaden (beyond executive functioning) or narrow (to a specific executive skill, such as working memory 
and its components) the search for more substantial cognitive underpinnings of this central skill in the 
creativity literature.  At present, these findings suggest that these three executive skills will not provide 
substantial inroads into profiling learners’ creativity-related skills and thus might also not be the most 
fruitful course for seeking to develop these creative cognitive skills through personalized educational 
interventions.  This presents opportunities for both the cognitive and nascent neural investigations of 
creativity to explore alternatives.  The largely null findings for interrelations between and mediation of 




disparate research bases of social cognitive neuroscience and the neurocognitive study of creativity is not 
built on any sort of substantial executive functioning foundation. 
Limitations 
It is important to clearly restate what this study did and did not accomplish.  The aim of this study 
was to investigate the relationships between student SES, executive functioning skills, and creative 
cognitive abilities.  So, as has been emphasized throughout, this does not provide a comprehensive 
investigation of creativity, broadly conceived.  There are many theoretical lenses and a variety of different 
measures in the field of creativity research; this research was specifically conducted within a 
neurocognitive framework, examining three particular verbal cognitive abilities predictive of creative 
behavior.  Thus, the conclusions reached here about relationships between student SES, verbal associative 
processing, and verbal RAT performance do not generalize to all of that which creativity encompasses, 
such as personality or cultural context.  Conclusions can only be drawn about individual cognition and 
individual family background.  However, because contextual influences are important to recognize, future 
studies seeking to extend upon these findings might consider also including, for example, measures of the 
average SES level at the student’s school or census tract in order to determine if this adds any additional 
explanatory power to creative cognitive findings. 
It is worth emphasizing further that not only do these findings inform one theoretical lens 
regarding creativity, they also are limited in the verbal nature of the measures.  That is, not only are any 
conclusions reached here linked only with verbal measures of creative cognitive skills, but the 
conclusions need to also be interpreted prudently given the substantial evidence base (some of which was 
reviewed above) of moderate to strong relationships between SES and various measures of language skills 
(e.g., comprehension, decoding, vocabulary recognition).  Given these known connections, future 
research should consider less-verbally-dependent creative cognitive measures or even spatial measures, 
such as the common figural counterparts to the DT tasks used here.  Indeed, the creative cognition 
approach described by Finke, Ward, and Smith (1992) explicitly focuses on the manipulation of mental 




manipulating a two-dimensional representation of a three-dimensional shape in order to arrive at other 
perspective and solutions.  It remains to be seen if the associations we found between SES and both 
associative processing and insight (as measured by the RAT items) can be replicated on more spatially-
reliant measures of these skills.   
This was a cross-sectional snapshot of students’ cognitive skills and households at one point in 
their developmental trajectories.  Thus, this research design limits the ability to draw causal inferences.  
Though causal work in the neurocognitive animal literature was presented as a theoretical backdrop for 
some of the SES-executive functioning connections, it is not possible to conclude from these results that 
SES caused higher performance task performance.   
 The results of this study will need to be replicated in other contexts, particularly given the nascent 
state of neurocognitive investigations of creativity.  External validity is somewhat limited (as conceived 
in Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002) in that students are being sampled voluntarily and purposively from 
relatively distinct settings around Baltimore and within a narrow age range.  Further, the range of 
academic abilities in this sample may be limited in variation in that we only recruited from talent 
development settings.  It is not clear to what population these results will generalize.  However, given that 
this study is an initial exploration of the relationships between these constructs, external validity is not an 
immediate concern, and in fact is quite typical of many basic neurological and cognitive research studies.  
It might be imagined, though, that future large-scale educational datasets could begin incorporating more 
specific cognitive measures pertaining to creativity, as they already have for executive functioning (e.g., 
see description of ECLS-K:2011 in Little, 2017) and socioeconomic status.  These would be in addition to 
the broader academic achievement and behavioral measures traditionally included and would thus allow 
for a much broader examination of the findings noted here and elsewhere in this area of research, with a 
sample more clearly generalizable, and with the ability to tie these measures to conventional academic 
measures. 
There is also evidence that the testing environment is related to performance on various creativity 




It was not practical in this study to recruit all students to the exact same room or setting since students 
were distributed geographically and temporally.  In order to maximize our sample size (and thus statistical 
power) we sacrificed control of the immediate testing context.  Though we made every effort to ensure 
that the testing conditions were as similar as possible (e.g., all students were tested individually with a 
researcher, with the same data collection methods, in rooms of roughly the same sizes), we caution that 
not all possible conditions could be controlled.  For example, when examining responses to the divergent 
thinking tasks, it was not uncommon to observe that some of the initial responses given by students 
coincided with items in the room where they were completing the task (e.g., a globe for round items, or 
classroom books for square items).  This concern is somewhat mitigated because multiple students were 
often tested in the same room, so such idiosyncratic responses primed by the immediate environment 
usually did not meet the threshold for being marked original since multiple students used this same 
strategy within the same setting.  
Finally, there are limitations (as well as benefits) to the sort of rule-based, replicable procedure 
we used for scoring participant responses on the DT tasks.  As already noted, one of the main benefits 
was efficiency; time-consuming DT scoring procedures have been noted as a barrier to including DT 
tasks in large-sample studies and has motivated others to seek less time-consuming alternatives (Silvia, 
Martin, & Nusbaum, 2009).  Another is that if any other researcher wished to replicate these results with 
this dataset, the above procedures should prove sufficiently clear to reproduce the DT fluency and 
originality scores.  A limitation of this method is that, though the above procedures could be applied 
objectively, their creation is obviously not objective.  Whereas we believed words such as “a” or “the” to 
be inconsequential in distinguishing original responses, others may disagree.  Others may suggest that our 
decision not to distinguish between plural and singular versions of the same response might not go far 
enough.  Ultimately, we believe the advantages associated with this objective scoring method outweigh 







 The results of this research present evidence for a relationship between student socioeconomic 
status and two common constructs associated with creative cognition: associative processing and insight, 
as measured by RAT performance.  More noteworthy, however, is what we did not find.  There is no 
substantial evidence in this sample that SES is related to four common measures of divergent thinking 
performance, two common indicators of executive functioning (shifting and inhibitory control), or two  
measures of insight.  Further, we were unable to replicate prior findings of any substantial executive 
functioning underpinnings of creative cognitive abilities.  Perhaps it is best to progress to a view 
executive functioning and creative cognitive skills as constructs: labels for a collection of underlying 
skills which should be operationalized and analyzed separately to advance the science and illuminate 
complex relationships with a student’s social circumstances.  And, altogether, these results demonstrate 
the usefulness of considering cognitive profiles of students from different socioeconomic context – a non-
deficit, strength-based approach to learning.  If replicated, these findings have potentially important 
implications for discussions about the policy and practice of educational equity regarding creativity, as 





Program Type Associations with Executive and Creative Cognitive Skills 
Because of the above-mentioned relationships between student race and ethnicity, Program Type, 
and SES in this sample, it may be reasonable to ask whether or not the core analyses might look different 
if examined by Program Type, rather than SES.  Given Program Type’s categorical nature, we estimated 
ANOVA models at alpha levels of 0.05 to evaluate associations between a student’s program 
participation and the cognitive abilities being presently examined. 
 Executive functioning skills.  Three one-way ANOVA models were created, for working 
memory, inhibitory control, and shifting, by program type (i.e., enrichment, summer, or lab).  Only the 
model for working memory was significant (F = 7.20).  Pairwise comparison of means revealed that the 
summer students performed significantly better than both the lab and enrichment students. 
 Creative cognitive skills.  Eight one-way ANOVA models were created, for Alphabetical-
Categorical fluency, DT Instances fluency, DT Instances originality, DT Unusual Uses fluency, DT 
Unusual Uses originality, Insight Problem scores, RAT scores, and Word Scramble scores.  Five models 
were significant: Alphabetical-Categorical fluency (F = 6.83), DT Instances originality (F = 3.16), Insight 
Problems (F = 14.54), RAT (F = 12.90), and Word Scramble scores (F = 4.35).  Subsequent post-hoc 
Tukey comparisons of group means revealed that summer students outperformed their enrichment peers 
in each model, and lab students also outperformed their enrichment peers on Insight Problem items. 
 We found that SES was related with associative processing, one measure of DT, and insight.  
These findings are basically replicated here and the likely explanation is the SES compositions of the 
different program types.  The only difference we noted was that SES was related with DT Instances 
fluency whereas Program Type is here associated with DT Instances originality.  It is worth mentioning 
that though our measure of originality is intended to control as much as possible the contribution of 
fluency, it is still only moderately successful in doing so, and so a relationship with either of these similar 







Given that, of the variables where missing values were addressed, SES both plays a critical role in 
the analyses and represented a relatively large number of removed students, we conducted additional 
analyses to see if these 14 students, removed from the dataset, were different in important ways from the 
remaining students with at least one SES indicator present (i.e., those included in our results).  Because 
both Program Type and race and ethnicity are closely related to SES in the overall sample, these two 
variables were examined first.   
 
Table B.1 
Comparison of Race and Ethnicity and Program Type Frequencies 
 % of Analytical 
Sample 
% of Removed Sample Two-Sample 
Proportions Test 
Program Type    
 Enrichment 54.63% 68.75% z = 1.06 (p = 0.29) 
 Lab 12.04% 12.50% z = 0.05 (p = 0.96) 
 Summer 33.33% 18.75% z = -1.17 (p = 0.24) 
Race and Ethnicity    
 Asian 14.81% 12.50% z = -0.96 (p = 0.34) 
 Black or African American 37.04% 43.75% z = 1.17 (p = 0.24) 
 White 29.63% 25.00% z = -0.59 (p = 0.56) 
 
 
The above table demonstrates, that for the Program Types and races and ethnicities known to be 
related to SES in this sample, there were no significant differences in the proportions of those categories 
between the groups excluded from and included in the subsequent analyses.  In fact, an examination of 
correlation coefficients between whether or not the student was included in the analysis and all other key 
study variables – using a liberal p-value of 0.05 – revealed only one significant correlation with age (r = 






 Below are complete tables for the regression results not shared in the Results chapter due to null 
or similar results. 
Does Student SES Predict the Creative Cognitive Skills?   
 
Table C.1 
Two-Step Regression Results Relating SES to DT (Instances Fluency) 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting DT) Model 2 (Add SES) 
  Coefficient β Coefficient β 
 Intercept 5.69  5.85  
 SES    0.03 (0.766) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.12 (0.210)  0.12 (0.239) 
 Processing speed  0.12 (0.271)  0.11 (0.295) 
 Age  0.07 (0.538)  0.06 (0.553) 
Adj. R2  0.02 (0.146)  0.01 (0.244) 
Δ Adj. R2    -0.01 (0.766) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; DT = divergent thinking. 







Two-Step Regression Results Relating SES to DT (Instances Originality) 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting DT) Model 2 (Add SES) 
  Coefficient β Coefficient β 
 Intercept 0.25  0.29  
 SES    0.15 (0.125) 
Covariates      
 Multilingualism  0.04 (0.670)  0.02 (0.874) 
 Processing speed  0.20 (0.067)  0.18 (0.104) 
 Age  0.04 (0.706)  0.03 (0.778) 
Adj. R2   0.03 (0.120)  0.04 (0.085) 
Δ Adj. R2     0.01 (0.125) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; DT = divergent thinking. 




Two-Step Regression Results Relating SES to DT (Uses Fluency) 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting DT) Model 2 (Add SES) 
  Coefficient β Coefficient β 
 Intercept 5.22  5.97  
 SES    0.21 (0.038) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.03 (0.728)  0.00 (0.992) 
 Processing speed  0.15 (0.174)  0.12 (0.277) 
 Age  0.01 (0.962)  -0.01 (0.933) 
Adj. R2  0.00 (0.418)  0.03 (0.126) 
Δ Adj. R2    0.03 (0.038) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; DT = divergent thinking. 







Two-Step Regression Results Relating SES to DT (Uses Originality) 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting DT) Model 2 (Add SES) 
  Coefficient β Coefficient β 
 Intercept 0.95  0.95  
 SES    0.02 (0.849) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.00 (0.997)  0.00 (0.971) 
 Processing speed  -0.14 (0.193)  -0.15 (0.190) 
 Age  -0.06 (0.559)  -0.06 (0.553) 
Adj. R2  0.00 (0.339)  0.00 (0.496) 
Δ Adj. R2    0.00 (0.849) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; DT = divergent thinking. 










Two-Step Regression Results Relating Executive Skills to DT (Instances Fluency) 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting DT) Model 2 (Add ES) 
  Coefficient β Coefficient β 
 Intercept 5.69  3.36  
 Working Memory    0.03 (0.788) 
 Inhibitory Control    0.09 (0.382) 
 Shifting    0.03 (0.781) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.12 (0.210)  0.09 (0.381) 
 Processing speed  0.12 (0.271)  0.15 (0.211) 
 Age  0.07 (0.538)  0.05 (0.633) 
Adj. R2  0.02 (0.146)  0.01 (0.333) 
Δ Adj. R2    -0.01 (0.796) 
Note. ES = executive skills; DT = divergent thinking. 







Two-Step Regression Results Relating Executive Skills to DT (Instances Originality) 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting DT) Model 2 (Add ES) 
  Coefficient β Coefficient β 
 Intercept 0.25  0.28  
 Working Memory    0.05 (0.664) 
 Inhibitory Control    -0.09 (0.389) 
 Shifting    -0.08 (0.433) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.04 (0.670)  0.01 (0.957) 
 Processing speed  0.20 (0.067)  0.21 (0.087) 
 Age  0.04 (0.706)  0.06 (0.586) 
Adj. R2  0.03 (0.120)  0.03 (0.190) 
Δ Adj. R2    0.00 (0.646) 
Note. ES = executive skills; DT = divergent thinking. 






Two-Step Regression Results Relating Executive Skills to DT (Uses Fluency) 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting DT) Model 2 (Add ES) 
  Coefficient β Coefficient β 
 Intercept 5.22  5.06  
 Working Memory    -0.03 (0.798) 
 Inhibitory Control    0.01 (0.886) 
 Shifting    0.00 (0.993) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.03 (0.728)  0.02 (0.877) 
 Processing speed  0.15 (0.174)  0.20 (0.111) 
 Age  0.01 (0.962)  0.00 (0.979) 
Adj. R2  0.00 (0.418)  -0.02 (0.714) 
Δ Adj. R2    -0.02 (0.994) 
Note. ES = executive skills; DT = divergent thinking. 






Two-Step Regression Results Relating Executive Skills to DT (Uses Originality) 
  Model 1 (Covariates predicting DT) Model 2 (Add ES) 
  Coefficient β Coefficient β 
 Intercept 0.95  0.89  
 Working Memory    -0.09 (0.415) 
 Inhibitory Control    0.08 (0.410) 
 Shifting    -0.08 (0.471) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.00 (0.997)  0.03 (0.784) 
 Processing speed  -0.14 (0.193)  -0.12 (0.339) 
 Age  -0.06 (0.559)  -0.05 (0.632) 
Adj. R2  0.00 (0.339)  -0.02 (0.616) 
Δ Adj. R2    -0.02 (0.626) 
Note. ES = executive skills; DT = divergent thinking. 






Are SES-Creative Cognitive Relations Mediated by or in Interaction With Executive Skills? 
Table C.9 
Two-Step Regression Examining SES-Executive Skills Interactions Predicting DT (Instances Fluency) 
  Model 1 (No Interactions) Model 2 (Add Interactions) 
  Coefficient β Coefficient β 
 Intercept 3.36  4.20  
 SES  0.00 (0.999)  0.29 (0.701) 
 Working Memory  0.03 (0.794)  0.07 (0.563) 
 Inhibitory Control  0.09 (0.386)  0.08 (0.449) 
 Shifting  0.03 (0.783)  0.02 (0.837) 
 SES x Working Memory    0.49 (0.230) 
 SES x Inhibitory Control    -0.77 (0.195) 
 SES x Shifting    0.00 (0.973) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.09 (0.389)  0.04 (0.702) 
 Processing speed  0.15 (0.215)  0.15 (0.214) 
 Age  0.05 (0.635)  0.02 (0.844) 
Adj. R2  0.00 (0.447)  0.01 (0.404) 
Δ Adj. R2    0.01 (0.313) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; DT = divergent thinking. 







Two-Step Regression Examining SES-Executive Skills Interactions Predicting DT (Instances 
Originality) 
  Model 1 (No Interactions) Model 2 (Add Interactions) 
  Coefficient β Coefficient β 
 Intercept 0.33  0.31  
 SES  0.13 (0.219)  1.74 (0.020) 
 Working Memory  0.02 (0.865)  0.04 (0.691) 
 Inhibitory Control  -0.10 (0.335)  -0.11 (0.250) 
 Shifting  -0.07 (0.472)  -0.09 (0.391) 
 SES x Working Memory    -0.29 (0.468) 
 SES x Inhibitory Control    -1.26 (0.031) 
 SES x Shifting    -0.12 (0.388) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  -0.01 (0.901)  -0.06 (0.605) 
 Processing speed  0.20 (0.104)  0.19 (0.120) 
 Age  0.06 (0.609)  0.08 (0.477) 
Adj. R2  0.03 (0.176)  0.07 (0.096) 
Δ Adj. R2    0.04 (0.119) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; DT = divergent thinking. 







Two-Step Regression Examining SES-Executive Skills Interactions Predicting DT (Uses Fluency) 
  Model 1 (No Interactions) Model 2 (Add Interactions) 
  Coefficient β Coefficient β 
 Intercept 6.03  5.81  
 SES  0.19 (0.078)  0.79 (0.303) 
 Working Memory  -0.07 (0.534)  -0.08 (0.511) 
 Inhibitory Control  0.00 (0.996)  0.00 (0.975) 
 Shifting  0.01 (0.930)  0.01 (0.922) 
 SES x Working Memory    -0.34 (0.414) 
 SES x Inhibitory Control    -0.27 (0.659) 
 SES x Shifting    -0.01 (0.919) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  -0.01 (0.918)  -0.01 (0.952) 
 Processing speed  0.18 (0.139)  0.18 (0.154) 
 Age  -0.01 (0.940)  0.01 (0.935) 
Adj. R2  0.00 (0.483)  -0.02 (0.665) 
Δ Adj. R2    -0.02 (0.848) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; DT = divergent thinking. 







Two-Step Regression Examining SES-Executive Skills Interactions Predicting DT (Uses Originality) 
  Model 1 (No Interactions) Model 2 (Add Interactions) 
  Coefficient β Coefficient β 
 Intercept 0.90  0.87  
 SES  0.03 (0.787)  -0.11 (0.888) 
 Working Memory  -0.10 (0.396)  -0.08 (0.516) 
 Inhibitory Control  0.08 (0.427)  0.08 (0.451) 
 Shifting  -0.07 (0.483)  -0.10 (0.371) 
 SES x Working Memory    0.25 (0.549) 
 SES x Inhibitory Control    0.00 (0.996) 
 SES x Shifting    -0.16 (0.278) 
Covariates     
 Multilingualism  0.03 (0.817)  0.00 (0.990) 
 Processing speed  -0.12 (0.333)  -0.12 (0.339) 
 Age  -0.06 (0.629)  -0.04 (0.707) 
Adj. R2  -0.03 (0.721)  -0.04 (0.805) 
Δ Adj. R2    -0.01 (0.653) 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status; DT = divergent thinking. 
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